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INTRODUCTION 
The stone walls of the Great Mosque in Mosul, Iraq are over 
eight centuries old.2 On a balmy July afternoon in 2014, these historic 
walls encircled the new leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
(“ISIS”), shrouded in black robes, as he prepared to give his first 
formal address as the self-proclaimed caliph.3 That day, children 
looked on as cars burned in Mosul’s streets.4 Black clouds of smoke 
ballooned above homes and the carcasses of police cars sat ablaze on 
highways.5 The Iraqi military had “crumbled” at the hands of the 
jihadists, who roamed the villages brandishing weapons.6 Families 
fled and Iraqi soldiers shed their uniforms as Islamic State militants 
                                                            
2. Great Mosque, Mosul, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/
place/Great-Mosque-Mosul-Iraq (discussing the age and location of the Great Mosque of 
Mosul); see also Mosul – Minaret of the Great Mosque of Nur al-Din, CULTURAL PROPERTY 
TRAINING RESOURCE, http://cchag.org/html/09476/iraq05-047.html (last visited Aug. 20, 
2015) (discussing the history of the Great Mosque).  
3. See Isis Chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Appears in First Video, BBC NEWS (July 5, 
2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28177848 (showing a video recording of 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s sermon in the Great Mosque at Mosul); Hannah Strange, Islamic 
State Leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Addresses Muslims in Mosul, THE TELEGRAPH (July 5, 
2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10948480/Islamic-State-
leader-Abu-Bakr-al-Baghdadi-addresses-Muslims-in-Mosul.html (discussing the ISIS leader’s 
sermon at the Mosul Great Mosque).  
4. See Suadad al-Salhy and Tim Arango, Sunni Militants Drive Iraqi Army Out of Mosul, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/11/world/middleeast/militants-
in-mosul.html (describing the destruction of Mosul and showing a photograph of children 
beside a burning car); see also Robert Mackey, Glimpses of Mosul in Islamist Hands on 
YouTube, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/11/world/middleeast/
glimpses-of-mosul-in-islamist-hands-on-youtube.html (describing a YouTube video where 
police cars are seen burning and abandoned). 
5. See Mackey, supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also al-Salhy & Arango, supra 
note 4 and accompanying text. 
6. See al-Salhy & Arango, supra note 4 and accompanying text; Mackey, supra note 4 
and accompanying text. 
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robbed banks and overtook police stations.7 Flying over Mosul’s 
government buildings was the black flag of Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria.8 
After the Islamic State had taken Mosul, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi 
climbed the ancient steps to a podium in the city’s most treasured 
landmark to give his first sermon as leader.9 He placed his left hand 
below his ribs as he approached the podium in the Great Mosque.10 
He raised his eyes to his audience and his hand curled into a fist as he 
declared the Islamic State a caliphate. “God has granted your 
brothers, the mujahideen, a victory.”11  
The fall of Mosul into the hands of the Islamic State marked a 
turning point in the United States’ foreign policy, necessitating both a 
military strategy and a legal justification for it.12 This Comment will 
evaluate the applicable legal arguments under international and US 
law for justifying the engagement against ISIS, paying special 
attention to the use of an Authorization for Use of Military Force 
(“AUMF”). First, in crafting a military response to the threat 
posed by ISIS, the United States had to reconcile its obligations under 
international laws of war with its own laws constraining military 
engagement.13 The legality of the US engagement against ISIS and 
the manner in which this engagement was carried out remain hotly 
contested.14 In order to explore the legal justifications for engagement 
                                                            
7. See al-Salhy & Arango, supra note 4 and accompanying text; Mackey, supra note 4 
and accompanying text. 
8. Martin Chulov, Isis Insurgents Seize Control of Iraqi city of Mosul, THE GUARDIAN, 
June 10, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/10/iraq-sunni-insurgents-islamic-
militants-seize-control-mosul (stating that the black flag of ISIS was raised above civic 
buildings); see al-Salhy & Arango, supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
9. See Isis Chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Appears in First Video, supra note 3 and 
accompanying text; Strange, supra note 3 and accompanying text.  
10. See Isis Chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Appears in First Video, supra note 3 and 
accompanying text; Strange, supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
11. See Isis Chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Appears in First Video, supra note 3 and 
accompanying text; Strange, supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
12. See, e.g., Chulov, supra note 8 (stating that Baghdad asked Washington for “missiles 
and artillery.”); Faith Karimi and Laura Smith-Spark, ISIS Militants Still Pressing Forward in 
Iraq, CNN NEWS (June 14, 2014, 5:56 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/13/world/meast/
iraq-violence/ (stating that “the spreading violence prompted U.S. President Barack Obama to 
say the beleaguered government required assistance”). 
13. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art II. See generally, U.N. Charter art. 2(4). 
14. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, White House Invites Congress to Approve ISIS Strikes, But 
Says it Isn’t Necessary, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/11/
world/middleeast/white-house-invites-congress-to-approve-isis-strikes-but-says-it-isnt-
necessary.html (quoting competing opinions by scholars on the legality of engagement against 
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against ISIS, some background on the United States’ response to ISIS 
is necessary. 
When ISIS took power in the summer of 2014, the White House 
and US President Barack Obama began devising a plan to respond to 
the growing military violence in Iraq.15 The response did not involve 
a formal declaration of war by Congress.16 Instead, it was an 
executive action that consisted of three main “legs:” air strikes in Iraq, 
the arming of Syrian rebels, and the formation of an international 
coalition.17  
The need for military engagement against ISIS grew out of the 
rampant violence, growing territorial dominion, and the humanitarian 
crisis of the Yazidis.18 The Yazidis, an ethno-religious group in Iraq, 
were victims of persecution and ethnic cleansing by ISIS militants in 
the summer of 2014.19 As ISIS grew in power, the Yazidis fled to a 
                                                                                                                                     
ISIS); Spencer Ackerman, Obama’s Legal Rationale for ISIS Strikes: Shoot First, Ask 
Congress Later, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 10, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/
sep/11/obama-isis-syria-air-strikes-legal-argument (arguing against the use of the 2001 AUMF 
as legal justification for engaging against ISIS). 
15. Barack Obama, President of the United States, Speech on ISIL (Aug. 7, 2014) 
(transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/07/statement-
president) [hereinafter Speech on ISIL] (announcing the response to ISIS); Senior 
Administration Official, Background Conference Call on the President’s Address to the Nation 
(Sep. 10, 2014) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/
09/10/background-conference-call-presidents-address-nation) (explaining the planned military 
response to ISIS). 
16. Barack Obama, President of the United States, Speech on Combating ISIS and 
Terrorism (Sep. 10, 2014) (transcript available at http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/10/politics/
transcript-obama-syria-isis-speech/) [hereinafter Speech on Combating ISIS] (calling on 
Congress to grant further authority to engage against ISIS); Josh Earnest, White House Press 
Secretary, The White House, Press Briefing (Sep. 12, 2014) (transcript available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/12/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-
earnest-9122014) (stating that congressional authority is not required and asserting the 
President’s inherent powers). 
17. Speech on Combating ISIS, supra note 16 and accompanying text; Senior 
Administration Official, supra note 15 (explaining the three legs of the planned military 
response to ISIS); Earnest, supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
18. Speech on ISIL, supra note 15 (announcing the need for humanitarian aid to civilians 
trapped on a mountain in Iraq); Raya Jalabi, Who Are the Yazidis and Why is ISIS Hunting 
Them, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 11, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/07/who-
yazidi-isis-iraq-religion-ethnicity-mountains (detailing the rampant violence of ISIS against 
the Yazidis); Kathy Gilsinan, The Many Ways to Map the Islamic ‘State’, THE ATLANTIC, 
Aug. 27, 2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/the-many-ways-to-
map-the-islamic-state/379196/ (describing the territorial expansion of ISIS).  
19. Speech on ISIL, supra note 15 (announcing the need for humanitarian aid to civilians 
trapped on a mountain in Iraq); Jalabi, supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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mountain in Iraq where they awaited near-certain death by 
encroaching ISIS militants.20  
In light of the Yazidi humanitarian crisis, President Obama cited 
humanitarian intervention as the first justification for engagement 
against ISIS.21 In a statement given on August 7, 2014, President 
Obama authorized two operations in Iraq.22 These operations 
consisted of “targeted airstrikes to protect our American personnel, 
and a humanitarian effort to help save thousands of Iraqi civilians 
who are trapped on a mountain without food and water and facing 
almost certain death.” 23  
While humanitarian intervention was the first justification given 
by the Obama Administration, this justification waned and was 
eclipsed by other legal arguments.24 One argument put forth by the 
Obama Administration was that the President could authorize 
engagement against ISIS under the 2001 Authorization for Use of 
                                                            
20. Isabel Coles & Saif Zamir, Islamic State advances against Yazidis on Iraq’s Sinjar 
mountain, REUTERS, Oct. 21, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/21/us-mideast-
crisis-iraq-sinjar-idUSKCN0IA1ZQ20141021 (describing the ISIS persecution of the Yazidis 
on Mount Sinjar); Jalabi, supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
21. Speech on ISIL, supra note 15 (announcing the need for a humanitarian reaction to 
the Yazidi crisis); see Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, 93 
AM. J. INT’L L. 824, 824 (1999) (discussing the legal implications of humanitarian 
intervention); see also Paul R. Williams & Meghan E. Stewart, Humanitarian Intervention: 
The New Missing Link In the Fight to Prevent Crimes Against Humanity and Genocide?, 40 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 97, 98 (2008) (providing an overview of requirements for the 
humanitarian intervention classification). 
22. Speech on ISIL, supra note 15 (authorizing two operations in Iraq); Helene Cooper, 
Mark Landler, & Alissa J. Rubin, Obama Allows Limited Airstrikes on ISIS, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
7, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/08/world/middleeast/obama-weighs-military-
strikes-to-aid-trapped-iraqis-officials-say.html (discussing airstrikes authorized by President 
Obama against ISIS).  
23. Speech on ISIL, supra note 15 (authorizing targeted airstrikes against ISIS); Jeremy 
Stahl, President Obama Authorizes Airstrikes in Iraq, SLATE, Aug. 7, 2014, http://www.slate.
com/blogs/the_slatest/2014/08/07/airstrikes_in_iraq_president_barack_obama_announces_
authorization_of_strikes.html (summarizing the President’s authorization of targeted airstrikes 
against ISIS). 
24. See, e.g., Earnest, supra note 16 (stating that the President can legally engage ISIS 
without congressional authorization); see also Senior Administration Official, supra note 15 
(answering a question about the legal grounds for engagement with ISIS by asserting the 
President’s statutory and constitutional authority). 
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Military Force (“2001 AUMF”).25 However, no clear justification 
under international law was offered.26  
In order for the US engagement against ISIS to be justified, the 
United States must comply with international law as well as with its 
own laws.27 The instant analysis will address US legal constraints 
dealing primarily with presidential war powers under the U.S. 
Constitution.28 Constitutionally, the President can only authorize 
military engagement in two cases.29 Either the President must have 
statutory authority from Congress in the form of an AUMF, or the 
engagement must be inherent in the President’s War Powers under 
Article II of the U.S. Constitution.30 In this case, the Obama 
Administration argued the former.31 Critics pushed back on this, 
arguing that the legal justifications given by White House lawyers 
were entirely incorrect.32 Some have argued that the 2001 AUMF was 
too outdated to serve as statutory authority in the current conflict.33 
Other critics argue that it is problematic for federalism, dealing too 
                                                            
25. Earnest, supra note 16 (stating that the President has authority to engage ISIS under 
the 2001 AUMF); Senior Administration Official, supra note 15 (citing the 2001 AUMF as the 
source for the President’s authority to conduct airstrikes against ISIS). 
26. Earnest, supra note 16 (stating that the President has authority to engage ISIS under 
the 2001 AUMF but not giving a justification under international law); Senior Administration 
Official, supra note 15 (citing the 2001 AUMF as the source for the President’s authority to 
conduct air strikes against ISIS and omitting any discussion of international law justifications). 
27. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2(4); U.S. CONST. art. II; War Powers Resolution of 1973, 
50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006). 
28. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II; War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 
(2006). 
29.  U.S. CONST. art. II. 
30.  Id. 
31. Earnest, supra note 16 (stating that the President has authority to engage ISIS under 
the 2001 AUMF); Senior Administration Official, supra note 15 (citing the 2001 AUMF as the 
source of the President’s authority to conduct airstrikes against ISIS). 
32. Krishnadev Calamur, Obama Has Support for Syria Strikes, But Are They Legal?, 
NPR, Sept. 25, 2014, http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2014/09/25/351433505/obama-has-
support-for-syria-strikes-but-are-they-legal (quoting several critiques of the Administrations 
use of the 2001 AUMF); see, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Obama’s Betrayal of the Constitution, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/12/opinion/obamas-betrayal-of-
the-constitution.html (arguing that the Obama Administration’s legal justification for fighting 
ISIS was incorrect). 
33. See, e.g., Ankit Panda, A Bad Idea: Using the 2001 AUMF as Legal Rationale For 
Striking ISIS, THE DIPLOMAT, Sept. 11, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/a-bad-idea-
using-the-2001-aumf-as-legal-rationale-for-striking-isis/ (arguing that the 2001 AUMF should 
have been repealed); see also Paul Kawika Martin, Is There An Alternative to War with ISIS?, 
MSNBC, Feb. 12, 2015, http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/alternative-war-isis (asserting that the 
2001 AUMF is outdated and should be repealed).  
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broad a grant of power to the executive branch.34 Some critique the 
use of the 2001 AUMF on grounds of legislative intent, arguing that it 
was intended to apply to al-Qaeda, not ISIS.35  
In addition to being legally sound under its own laws, the United 
States’ engagement must be in compliance with international law 
since the United States is party to the United Nations Charter and sits 
on the United Nations Security Council.36 In international law, there 
are two branches of the laws of war that would apply to the United 
States in military engagement: jus ad bellum and jus in bello.37 The 
first deals with legal justifications for going to war and the second 
deals with the laws that govern the combat itself.38 The instant 
analysis will focus primarily on the former as it applies to the US 
justifications for engaging against ISIS. Moreover, this Comment will 
evaluate the legal tools in the US executive toolbox, specifically 
focusing on the US obligations under the UN Charter as well as under 
US law.  
Part I of this Comment will lay out the potential arguments the 
United States could make to justify its engagement against ISIS under 
international law, jus ad bellum. This Part will also present existing 
commentary on the strengths and weaknesses of the available legal 
justifications. Part II will lay out the legal justifications under US law 
and discuss their nexus to the United States’ international obligations. 
                                                            
34. Jack Goldsmith, Obama’s Breathtaking Expansion of a President’s Power to Make 
War, TIME, Sept. 11, 2014, http://time.com/3326689/obama-isis-war-powers-bush/ (arguing 
that the 2001 AUMF is too expansive a grant of executive power); Bruce Ackerman, supra 
note 32 (arguing that President Obama went beyond his Constitutional powers in engaging 
against ISIS in this manner). For a discussion of the tension between the executive and 
legislative branches in matters of national security, see Celidon Pitt, Fair Trade: The 
President’s Power to Recover Captured U.S. Servicemembers and the Recent Prisoner 
Exchange with the Taliban, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2837, 2841 (2015) (discussing the Bergdahl 
prisoner exchange as “most recent example of the tension between the executive and 
legislative branches over the conduct and funding of national security–related matters”). 
35. Brett Logiurato, Congressman: Obama’s Expansion of His ISIS Campaign Is 
‘Illegal’, BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 24, 2014, 3:38 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
obama-isis-legal-aumf-congress-2014-9 (arguing that ISIS is not connected to perpetrators of 
9/11 and cannot be fought under the 2001 AUMF); Ackerman, supra note 32 (arguing that 
ISIS is not an affiliate of al-Qaeda and thus the 2001 AUMF does not apply). 
36. See generally U.N. Charter. 
37. See Steven R. Ratner, Jus Ad Bellum and Jus in Bello After September 11, 96 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 905, 906 (2002) (laying out the difference between jus ad bellum and jus in bello); 
Robert D. Sloane, The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus Ad Bellum and Jus in 
Bello in the Contemporary Law of War, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 47, 48 (2009) (explaining the 
types of legal justification for war).  
38. See Ratner, supra note 37; Sloane, supra note 37. 
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Finally, Part III will argue that the United States’ engagement is 
appropriately classified as an instance of collective self-defense under 
international law. This Part will discuss what new AUMF would be 
needed in order to be consistent with United States international law 
obligations. 
I. US ENGAGEMENT AGAINST ISIS UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 
This Part will discuss the relevant international law provisions 
applicable to the United States engagement against ISIS. One of the 
main sources of international law binding the United States here is the 
UN Charter.39 Most pertinently, under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, 
UN member States must refrain from the “threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations.”40 Thus, member States cannot use force except in certain 
circumstances with permission of the UN Security Council.41  
As of December 2014, the United States does not have explicit 
authorization from the UN Security Council for military engagement 
against ISIS.42 The United States then has two options in order to be 
compliant with Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.43 First, it can seek 
authorization from the Security Council to use force.44 Second, the 
United States can argue that it falls under one of the two exceptions in 
the UN Charter which permits use of force without Security Council 
authorization.45 These two exceptions are the use of force for 
purposes of individual or collective self-defense.46  
This Part lays out the paths open to the United States in 
justifying its engagement under international law. Part I.A explores 
the first option open to the United States, namely, the pursuit of a UN 
Security Council Resolution authorizing the use of force against ISIS. 
Part I.B discusses collective self-defense, the first of the two 
                                                            
39. See generally U.N. Charter. 
40. U.N. Charter art. 2(4).  
41. Id. 
42. See generally Security Council Resolutions in 2014 (showing that as of December 
2014, no Security Council Resolution gave explicit resolution for military engagement against 
ISIS). 
43. See U.N. Charter art. 2(4). 
44. See U.N. Charter art. 51. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. ¶ 1. 
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exceptions under Article 51 of the UN Charter that would permit the 
United States to use force without UN authorization. Part I.C explores 
individual self-defense, the second exception under Article 51 that 
would exempt the United States from the requirement to seek 
authorization. Part I.D will address pre-emptive self-defense, a notion 
rooted in international case law that the United States could argue 
justifies its engagement against ISIS. Finally, Part I.E will lay out the 
“ongoing conflict” argument, which posits that ISIS is the most recent 
development in an ongoing conflict in the Middle East in which the 
United States is already involved. 
A. United Nations Security Council Resolution  
The first path the United States could take to justify its 
engagement against ISIS involves seeking an authorization for use of 
force from the United Nations by way of a Security Council 
Resolution.47 Chapter VII of the UN Charter governs state action with 
respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of 
aggression.48 Under Chapter VII, Article 39, the UN Security Council 
must first determine that a threat or breach of the peace has 
occurred.49 The UN Security Council has already done this in 
Resolution 2178, passed on September 24, 2014.50 The purpose of 
Resolution 2178 was to stop home-grown terrorists in member States 
from radicalizing and being recruited by ISIS.51 In this resolution, the 
Security Council declares ISIS a terrorist group and notes that 
terrorism is, “one of the most serious threats to international peace.”52 
Thus, the first element for legal authorization is met since ISIS is 
described as a threat to the peace. Next, the Security Council would 
need to authorize the use of force in order to combat ISIS.53  
To authorize the use of force, the Security Council typically 
employs the language “all necessary means” to signal such 
                                                            
47. See U.N. Charter art. 39; Ashley Deeks, U.S. Airstrikes Against ISIS in Syria? 
Possible International Legal Theories, LAWFARE BLOG (Aug. 23, 2014, 3:04 PM), 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/08/u-s-airstrikes-against-isis-in-syria-possible-international
-legal-theories/ (laying out the possible legal theories the United States could posit to justify 
engaging against ISIS). 
48. U.N. Charter art. 39. 
49. Id. 
50. S.C. Res. 2178, ¶ 1 (Sep. 24, 2014). 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. U.N. Charter art. 39. 
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authorization.54 Resolution 2178, however, does not use this language 
and does not deal with engaging against ISIS directly.55 Indeed, this 
resolution focuses specifically on stopping the “flow of foreign 
terrorist fighters” within member States that radicalize and go on to 
work for ISIS.56 The purpose of this resolution is to encourage 
countries to exercise control over potential home-grown terrorists 
within their countries.57 It does not necessarily authorize the United 
States or other member States to use force to “degrade and destroy” 
ISIS in Iraq and Syria.58  
Since the only existing resolution on ISIS, Resolution 2178, does 
not confer authorization for use of force, the United States must 
explicitly request authorization from the Security Council.59 However, 
some scholars suggest that the Security Council will not authorize 
force against ISIS (specifically in Syria) for political reasons.60 
Specifically, if the United States sought Security Council 
authorization to engage against ISIS, the United States and its allies 
would need consensus from the permanent five members of the 
Security Council who retain a veto power: China, Russia, the United 
States, France, and the United Kingdom.61 Specifically, it is suggested 
that Russia or China would oppose the resolution, nullifying the 
unanimity among the permanent five Security Council members 
                                                            
54. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 678, ¶ 2 (Nov. 29, 1990) (authorizing the use of “all necessary 
means” to combat the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait); see also Rob McLaughlin, An Assessment of 
the Authority for Australia to Use Force Under United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
Concerning Iraq, 51 NAVAL L. REV. 252, 264 (2005) (discussing the “all necessary means” 
language in Gulf War resolutions). 
55. S.C. Res. 2178, (Sep. 24, 2014). 
56. Id. ¶ 24. 
57. Id. ¶ 4. 
58. Id.. 
59. U.N. Charter art. 39. 
60. See, e.g., Josh Rogin, White House Has NO International Legal Justification for 
Hitting ISIS in Syria, THE DAILY BEAST (Sep. 23, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/
articles/2014/09/15/white-house-has-no-international-legal-justification-for-hitting-isis-in-
syria.html (stating that Russia would be “sure to veto” a Security Council Resolution 
authorizing force against ISIS); see also Deeks, supra note 47 (suggesting that the option for a 
Security Council Resolution was a “dead letter” in 2012 because Russia and China would not 
oppose the Syrian regime). 
61. See The Security Council, UNITED NATIONS WEBSITE, http://www.un.org/en/sc/ 
(describing the veto power of the permanent five members of the Security Council); see also 
Current Members, UNITED NATIONS WEBSITE, http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/ (listing the 
five permanent members of the Security Council).  
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required for a resolution.62 Russia or China may veto this request for 
authorization for various geopolitical reasons.63 For example, the 
United States has stated that its foreign policy includes arming the 
Syrian rebels so that they also fight against the regime of Bashar al-
Assad.64 Since Russia and China have aligned politically with Syria, it 
is possible that they would veto any resolution opposing the Syrian 
regime.65 For these reasons, a Security Council resolution authorizing 
engagement against ISIS explicitly is at a high risk of being vetoed. 
The United States then has a few other paths it could pursue to 
obtain international legal justification.66 It could argue that it does not 
need Security Council Authorization to engage against ISIS because 
the engagement qualifies as self-defense.67 There are two kinds of 
self-defense recognized under Article 51 of the UN Charter that 
would exempt the United States from needing to seek Security 
Council authorization for use of force: collective and individual self-
defense.68 The US could also argue that this is an instance of pre-
emptive self-defense, a concept rooted in international case law, but 
collective and individual self-defense are the only two exceptions 
listed in the UN Charter.69  
                                                            
62. See, e.g., Rogin, supra note 60 and accompanying text; see also Deeks, supra note 
47 (suggesting that the option for a Security Council Resolution was a “dead letter” in 2012 
because Russia and China would not oppose the Syrian regime). 
63. Russia and China frequently align to veto together; for instance, in May 2014, they 
aligned to strike down a resolution referring Syria to the International Criminal Court. They 
have also vetoed in tandem three other resolutions related to the Middle East and Syria since 
2011. Security Council Veto List, DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD LIBRARY, http://research.un.org/en/
docs/sc/quick (last visited Dec. 19, 2014); see, e.g., UN: Russian and Chinese Vetoes of Syria 
ICC Resolution ‘Callous’, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/un-
russian-chinese-vetoes-syria-icc-resolution-callous-2014-05-22 [hereinafter Russian and 
Chinese Vetoes] (quoting Amnesty International’s Middle East and North Africa Programme 
Director who referred to the veto as a “callous political move”). 
64. Senior Administration Official, supra note 15. 
65. Security Council Veto List, supra note 63; see, e.g., Russian and Chinese Vetoes, 
supra note 63. 
66. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 51 (stating the exceptions under which a State could use 
force without Security Council authorization). 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 51. See generally James A. Green, Docking the Caroline: 
Understanding the Relevance of the Formula in Contemporary Customary International Law 
Concerning Self-Defense, 14 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 429, 435 (2006); Abraham 
Sofaer, On the Necessity of Pre-emption, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 209, 210 n.2 (2003).  
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 B. Collective Self-Defense 
The alternative to gaining Security Council authorization is to 
demonstrate that the use of force against ISIS falls within one of the 
two self-defense exceptions recognized under Article 51 of the UN 
Charter, collective or individual self-defense.70 A situation of 
collective security is one where the “protection of the rights of the 
states, the reaction against the violation of the law, assumes the 
character of a collective enforcement action.”71 There are two ways of 
framing the collective self-defense argument. The first envisions 
collective self-defense as a situation where one country could ask for 
assistance in its own self-defense.72 An example of this type of 
collective self-defense lies in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (“NATO”) Treaty, which states that members of the 
collective will fight in response to an armed attack against any 
member.73 This understanding of collective self-defense has one 
important limitation, namely, that it would geographically limit the 
United States’ engagement against ISIS to Iraqi territory since Syria 
has not consented to assistance from the United States and its NATO 
allies.74 Furthermore, this approach would be contingent on Iraqi 
consent to the international community’s assistance.75 Iraq could 
withdraw this consent and easily invalidate this collective self-defense 
argument.76 The second framing for a collective self-defense 
argument is that an attack on one country is an attack on all members 
of the collective.77 This is the typical understanding of collective self-
defense and the one NATO uses in its charter, the North Atlantic 
                                                            
70. See U.N. Charter art. 51 (stating the exceptions under which a State could use force 
without Security Council authorization). 
71. Hans Kelsen, Collective Security and Collective Self-Defense Under the Charter of 
the United Nations, 42 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 783, 783 (1948) (defining collective security); see 
also Deeks, supra note 47 (suggesting that Iraq’s request for assistance from other states could 
constitute self-defense). 
72. Deeks, supra note 47 (explaining that Iraqi consent is necessary for collective self-
defense). 
73. North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243. 
74. Deeks, supra note 47.  
75. Id.  
76. Id.  
77. See e.g., Robert J. Delahunty, Paper Charter: Self-Defense and the Failure of the 
United Nations Collective Security System, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 871, 887 (2007) (discussing 
the typical understanding of collective self-defense); Eustace Chikere Azubuike, Probing the 
Scope of Self-defense in International Law, 17 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 129, 158 (2011) 
(stating that NATO encouraged all member States to invoke collective self-defense in response 
to 9/11).  
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Treaty.78 The key distinction between the first and second framings of 
collective self-defense is that the first explicitly requires the consent 
of the country suffering the attack.79 It is unclear whether the second 
requires the consent of the attacked country.80 The importance of this 
distinction will be discussed in Section III.  
C. Individual Self-Defense  
Another exception to the authorization of the use of force also 
lies in the UN Charter Article 51 and requires that the United States 
demonstrate that engaging against ISIS is necessary for its individual 
self-defense.81 There are a number of legal constraints to invoking 
either individual or collective self-defense.82 As stated in Article 51, a 
State can invoke self-defense only in the event of an “armed attack.”83 
Even where an armed attack takes place, the engagement must only 
go on “until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security.”84 As such, the threshold 
question is whether the activities of ISIS amount to an “armed attack” 
against the United States.85 
There are two potential readings of Article 51: a strict textualist 
reading and a broader purposivist reading.86 This Comment discusses 
both interpretations of Article 51 in turn and explores any arguments 
the United States could make under each interpretation. Under the 
strict textualist reading, a State would need an armed attack before it 
                                                            
78. North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 73, art. 5. 
79. Deeks, supra note 47 (explaining that Iraqi consent is necessary for collective self-
defense). 
80. See e.g., Delahunty, supra note 77, at 887 (discussing the typical understanding of 
collective self-defense without mention of consent on behalf of the attacked state); Chikere 
Azubuike, supra note 77, at 158 (stating that NATO invoked collective self-defense before the 
U.N. Security Council after 9/11 and encouraged collective self-defense on behalf of all 
member states). 




85. Id.; see e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of “Armed Attack” in 
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 41, 45 (2002) (analyzing the definition of 
an “armed attack”). 
86. See Stuart G. Baker, Comparing the 1993 U.S. Airstrike on Iraq to the 1986 Bombing 
of Libya: The New Interpretation of Article 51, 24 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 99, 109 (1994) 
(discussing the two ways of interpreting Article 51); see also Thomas K. Plofchan, Jr., Article 
51: Limits on Self-Defense?, 13 MICH. J. INT’L L. 336, 340 (1992) (outlining the debate on the 
two interpretations of Article 51). 
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could respond in self-defense.87 Article 51 seems to indicate that a 
State must wait to be attacked in order to exercise its right to self-
defense.88 This textualist interpretation of Article 51 and the question 
of whether its requirement is so strict are subject to some 
controversy.89 Under this reading, it may be too late to exercise a right 
of self-defense if a State has to wait to be attacked.90 This strict 
reading could erode at the concept of a right to self-defense because it 
could require States to wait until a point where they can no longer 
defend themselves.91 Alternatively, the purposivist approach 
encourages a broader understanding of Article 51.92 Under this 
reading, Article 51 was designed to preserve the State’s right to self-
defense and, thus, if excessive waiting would jeopardize a State’s 
ability to defend itself, Article 51 should be read to allow a carve-out 
for self-defense before a State suffers an armed attack.93  
Whether or not a State is entitled to self-defense also turns on 
how the term “armed attack” is defined.94 Under a strict 
understanding of Article 51, the United States could argue that the 
brutal murders of James Foley, Steven Sotloff, and other US 
                                                            
87. See Murphy, supra note 85 and accompanying text; see also Miriam Sapiro, Iraq: 
The Shifting Sands of Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 599, 604 (2003) (discussing 
changing notions of self-defense and the interpretation of Article 51). 
88. See Murphy, supra note 85 and accompanying text; see also Sapiro, supra note 87 
and accompanying text. 
89. Murphy, supra note 85 and accompanying text; Ruth Wedgwood, The Fall of 
Saddam Hussein: Security Council Mandates and Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 
576, 584 (2003) (discussing the implications of reading Article 51 for justifying pre-emptive 
self-defense). 
90. See Murphy, supra note 85 (arguing for a reading of Article 51 that preserves a right 
to self-defense before territorial attack); see also Sapiro, supra note 87 and accompanying text.  
91. See Murphy, supra note 85 (arguing for a reading of Article 51 that preserves a right 
to self-defense before territorial attack); see also Sapiro, supra note 87, at 604 (discussing 
changing notion of self-defense and the interpretation of Article 51); Michael J. Glennon, The 
Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51 of the United Nations 
Charter, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 539, 547 (2002) (discussing narrow constructions of 
“armed attack” under Article 51). 
92. See Murphy, supra note 85 (arguing for a reading of Article 51 that preserves a right 
to self-defense before territorial attack); see also Sapiro, supra note 87 (discussing changing 
notion of self-defense and the interpretation of Article 51). 
93. See Carsten Stahn, Terrorist Acts as “Armed Attack”: The Right to Self-Defense, 
Article 51(1/2) of the UN Charter, and International Terrorism, 27 FALL FLETCHER F. WORLD 
AFF. 35, 38 (2003) (discussing the risks and benefits of a broad interpretation of Article 51); 
Murphy, supra note 85 (arguing for a reading of Article 51 that preserves a right to self-
defense before territorial attack). 
94. See Stahn, supra note 93 and accompanying text; see Murphy, supra note 85 
(arguing for a reading of Article 51 that preserves a right to self-defense before territorial 
attack). 
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journalists meet the definition of an “armed attack” against the United 
States as required by Article 51.95 The case governing the definition 
of an armed attack is Nicaragua v. United States, brought before the 
International Court of Justice (“I.C.J.”).96 Nicaragua states that an 
armed attack does not only consist of an action by regular armed 
forces but could also include the sending of violent bands or groups 
which use force with enough gravity to constitute an armed attack.97 
While there has not yet been a territorial attack against the United 
States by ISIS forces, the killing of American journalists may suffice 
to meet the definition of “armed attack” as it is interpreted by 
Nicaragua.98 However, if a narrower definition of “armed attack” is 
used, the United States may not meet the definition of “armed attack” 
for purposes of Article 51 and may not claim individual self-
defense.99  
If the United States does not meet the definition for having 
suffered an “armed attack” under Article 51, it may be able to justify 
engaging against ISIS under the international law theory of pre-
emptive self-defense.100 Pre-emptive self-defense is a concept rooted 
                                                            
95. U.N. Charter, art. 51; see also Amir Abdallah, Urgent Video: Peter Kassig Beheaded 
by ISIS with 16 Syrians, IRAQI NEWS (Nov. 16, 2014), http://www.iraqinews.com/features/
urgent-video-peter-kassig-beheaded-isis-16-syrians/ (showing the beheading of Peter Kassig 
by ISIS); Chelsea Carter & Ashley Fantz, ISIS Video Shows Beheading of American Journalist 
Steven Sotloff, CNN (Sep. 9, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/02/world/meast/isis-
american-journalist-sotloff/ (discussing the brutality of ISIS violence against American 
journalist Steven Sotloff). The murders of journalists like Sotloff were conducted overseas and 
thus may not qualify as an armed attack if the “attack” in question must be a territorial attack 
upon the continental United States. 
96. See generally Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) (defining an armed attack). 
97. Id. (defining an armed attack as including “the sending by or on behalf of a State of 
armed bands, groups, irregulars, or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against 
another State of such gravity as to amount to” an armed attack). 
98. See Baker, supra note 86 and accompanying text; Plofchan, Jr., supra note 86 and 
accompanying text. 
99. See e.g., Glennon, supra note 91, at 546 (discussing narrow constructions of “armed 
attack” under Article 51); see also Stahn, supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
100. Green, supra note 69, at 435 (providing the history and origins of pre-emptive self-
defense and describing the Caroline case in international law); Sofaer, supra note 69, at 226 
(arguing for the concept of pre-emptive self-defense).  
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in international case law.101 It is entirely separate from Article 51 and 
the concept even pre-dates the United Nations by nearly a century.102  
D. Pre-emptive Self-Defense 
The doctrine of pre-emptive self-defense is credited to former 
American Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, who articulated it in 
1842 after the infamous Caroline Incident.103 In 1837, the British 
destroyed a US ship called the Caroline because they believed it was 
being used to support Canadian forces in a rebellion against the 
crown.104 Daniel Webster, then Secretary of State, corresponded with 
British Foreign Minister Lord Ashburton in letters that would later be 
credited as recognizing the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defense.105 
Under Webster’s understanding of self-defense, a State can pre-
emptively defend itself if there is a need that is “instant, 
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for 
deliberation.”106 Webster also added a “proportionality” requirement 
and crystalized this notion of pre-emptive self-defense into what is 
now known as the “Caroline Test.”107  
This proportionality element requires that a State only do what is 
absolutely necessary in its self-defense, and nothing more 
excessive.108 The Caroline Test was recognized by the Nuremberg 
                                                            
101. Green, supra note 69 (discussing the Caroline case and analyzing pre-emptive self-
defense in international case law); Sofaer, supra note 69, at 226 (arguing for the validity of the 
concept of pre-emptive self-defense).  
102. Green, supra note 69 (exploring the Caroline doctrine and its historical roots); 
Sofaer, supra note 69, at 226 (arguing for the concept of pre-emptive self-defense).  
103. Green, supra note 69 (providing the history and origins of pre-emptive self-defense 
and describing the Caroline case in international law); Sofaer, supra note 69, at 226 (arguing 
for the concept of pre-emptive self-defense).  
104. Green, supra note 69 (providing the history and origins of pre-emptive self-defense 
and describing the Caroline case in international law); Sofaer, supra note 69, at 226 (arguing 
for the concept of pre-emptive self-defense).  
105. Green, supra note 69 (providing the history and origins of pre-emptive self-defense 
and describing the Caroline case in international law); Sofaer, supra note 69, at 226 (arguing 
for the concept of pre-emptive self-defense). 
106. Green, supra note 69 (providing the history and origins of pre-emptive self-defense 
and describing the Caroline case in international law); Sofaer, supra note 69, at 226 (arguing 
for the concept of pre-emptive self-defense). 
107. James Denver & John Denver, Making Waves: Refitting the Caroline Doctrine for 
the Twenty-First Century, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 165 (2013) (explaining the basic tenets of 
the Caroline Test); Timothy Kearley, Raising the Caroline, 17 WIS. INT’L L.J. 325, 331 (1999) 
(outlining the history of the Caroline Test). 
108. Denver, supra note 107 (explaining the basic tenets of the Caroline Test); Kearley, 
supra note 107 (outlining the history of the Caroline Test). 
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Tribunal when it judged Germany’s invasion of Norway in World 
War II.109 It has been applied most recently to the US policy regarding 
cyber attacks as well as US responses to terrorism in the Middle 
East.110 Unlike the theory of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN 
Charter, pre-emptive self-defense does not require the same kind of 
immediacy.111 Pre-emptive self-defense allows for responses to 
imminent threats before they materialize into immediate attacks.112 
In order to engage against ISIS under pre-emptive self-defense, 
the United States would need to demonstrate necessity and 
proportionality, the requirements of the Caroline test stated above.113 
The United States could argue that engagement is necessary since 
ISIS has directly targeted and killed American journalists in order to 
send a message to the United States, threatening further violence.114  
The growing wealth and territorial expansion of ISIS has led the 
United States to view it as a credible national security threat.115 In a 
letter to Congress on August 17, 2014, President Obama also pointed 
to dangers posed to “US personnel and facilities, including the US 
                                                            
109. Jack M. Beard, America’s New War on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense Under 
International Law, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 559, 585 n.91 (2002) (stating that the 
Caroline Test was applied by the Nuremburg Tribunal); Green, supra note 69, at 447 
(discussing the application of the Caroline Test in the Nuremberg Tribunal). 
110. John Denver & James Denver, Cyberwarfare: Attribution, Preemption, and 
National Self-defense, 2 J.L. & CYBER WARFARE 25, 37 (2013) (applying the Caroline Test to 
cybersecurity); see also Denver, supra note 107; Thomas R. Anderson, Legitimizing the New 
Imminence: Bridging the Gap Between the Just War and the Bush Doctrine, 8 GEO. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 261, 265 (2010) (discussing the Caroline Test in the modern context). 
111. See Denver, supra note 107, at 193; Kearley, supra note 107, at 331 (outlining the 
history of the Caroline Test). 
112. See e.g., Denver, supra note 107; see also Anderson, supra note 107, at 265 
(discussing the Caroline Test in the modern context). 
113. Denver, supra note 107 (explaining the basic tenants of the Caroline Test); Kearley, 
supra note 107, at 331. 
114. See e.g., Abdallah, supra note 95 (showing ISIS’s targeting of Americans like Peter 
Kassig); see also Carter & Fantz, supra note 95 (showing the beheading of an American 
journalist by ISIS). See generally, Deeks, supra note 47 (explaining that the necessity 
argument would be rooted in preventing further violence by ISIS).  
115. Letter from Barack Obama, President of the United States, to the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, (Aug. 17, 2014), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/17/letter-president-war-powers-
resolution-regarding-iraq (stating that actions against ISIS are in the interest of national 
security); see also Senior Administration Official, supra note 15 (detailing the plan to combat 
ISIS and prevent further violence).  
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Embassy in Baghdad.”116 More broadly, if ISIS were to establish 
enough power to dominate the region and (in the worst of cases) 
acquire more destructive weapons, the United States may be a 
primary target.117 ISIS’s attacks on American journalists and its 
continuing threats to increase violence against the United States may 
provide sufficient basis to find a need for self-defense.118 Evidence of 
credible threats by ISIS against the United States strengthens the 
necessity argument for pre-emptive self-defense.119 
The necessity element is met if the need for defensive action is 
imminent, “instant” and “overwhelming” under the Caroline Test.120 
The defensive action must occur in the last possible window of time 
before an almost certain attack.121 Under this prong of the Caroline 
test, the United States could argue that ISIS had already taken over 
Mosul and was poised to gain further territory in Iraq.122 Moreover, 
                                                            
116. Letter from Barack Obama, supra note 115 (stating that ISIS poses a threat to US 
personnel and facilities); see also Senior Administration Official, supra note 15 (detailing the 
plan to combat ISIS and prevent further violence).  
117. See, e.g., Carter & Fantz, supra note 114 (showing ISIS’s targeting of United States 
journalist); see Abdallah, supra note 114 (showing attacks by ISIS that deliberately target 
United States citizens).   
118. See Thomas R. Anderson, Legitimizing the New Imminence: Bridging the Gap 
Between the Just War and the Bush Doctrine, 8 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 261, 265 (2010) 
(discussing the Caroline test for pre-emptive self-defense); Deeks, supra note 47 (explaining 
possible United States arguments for why combating ISIS is necessary); see also, Denver, 
supra note 107, at 173-74 (explaining the basic tenets of the Caroline Test).  
119. Deeks, supra note 47 (arguing that “the more specific, serious, and tangible those 
threats, the stronger the case for anticipatory air strikes”); see Denver, supra note 107 
(explaining the basic tenets of the Caroline Test, which determines the validity of a self-
defense argument); Anderson, supra note 118 (discussing the Caroline test for pre-emptive 
self-defense). 
120.  See James A. Green, Docking the Caroline: Understanding the Relevance of the 
Formula in Contemporary Customary International Law Concerning Self-Defense, 14 
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 429, 435 (2006) (explaining pre-emptive self-defense and 
describing the Caroline case in international law); see also, Abraham D. Sofaer, On the 
Necessity of Pre-emption, 14 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 209 (2003) (arguing for the concept of pre-
emptive self-defense).  
121. Michael N. Schmitt, U.S. Security Strategies: A Legal Assessment, 27 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POLY. 737, 755-56 (2004) (stating that the inquiry is “whether the defensive action 
occurred during the last possible window of opportunity in the face of an attack that was 
almost certainly going to occur.”). See generally Green, supra note 120 (explaining pre-
emptive self-defense and describing the Caroline case in international law).  
122. See, e.g., Sarah Almukhtar & Jeremy Ashkenas et al., The Front Line Between ISIS 
and Iraqi Forces in Tikrit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2014/06/12/world/middleeast/the-iraq-isis-conflict-in-maps-photos-and-video.html (showing 
through informational graphics the territory gained by ISIS); see also Barbara Starr & Susanna 
Capelouto, Plan to Retake Mosul from ISIS Emerges, CNN, Nov. 29, 2014, http://www.
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the aforementioned attacks against American journalists had already 
been carried out.123 The United States would have needed to argue 
that waiting any longer to respond to ISIS would have resulted in 
further deaths and territorial acquisition, which threatens United 
States personnel or global peace.124  
International case law suggests that the United States would 
need to exhaust all peaceful remedies before pre-emptive self-defense 
is warranted.125 For instance, the UN Security Council rejected a pre-
emptive self-defense made by Israel when it failed to exhaust all 
peaceful remedies first.126 In 1981, Israel had destroyed a nuclear 
reactor near Baghdad, arguing that Iraq was building a weapon to use 
against Israel.127 The United Nations rejected Israel’s pre-emptive 
self-defense argument on the grounds that Israel had not exhausted all 
peaceful means before resorting to force.128 Former State Department 
Legal Advisor William H. Taft highlighted in a memorandum that the 
UN Security Council unanimously condemned the attack, despite 
Israel’s preemptive self-defense argument.129 UN member States 
pointed to the fact that the Iraqi reactor was in full compliance with 
                                                                                                                                     
cnn.com/2014/11/28/world/meast/mosul-attack-plan/ (stating the United States response to 
ISIS overtaking Mosul).  
123. See Abdallah, supra note 114 (showing attacks by ISIS that deliberately target 
United States citizens); see, e.g., Carter & Fantz, supra note 114 (showing ISIS’s targeting of 
United States journalist). 
124. See Green, supra note 120 (explaining pre-emptive self-defense and describing the 
Caroline case in international law); see also Sofaer, supra note 120.  
125. See Memorandum from William H. Taft, Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, to 
Members of the ASIL-CFR Roundtable (Nov. 18 2001), http://www.cfr.org/international-
law/legal-basis-preemption/p5250 (discussing the legal basis for preemption and explaining 
the Israel case). See generally, S.C. Res. 487, (June 19, 1981) (detailing the United Nations’ 
condemnation of violent extremism and serving as an example of one kind of peaceful remedy 
the United States has sought, namely, Security Council condemnation).  
126.  See Memorandum from William H. Taft, supra note 125; see, e.g., S.C. Res. 2178 
(Sep. 24, 2014) (detailing the UN’s condemnation of violent extremism and serving as an 
example of one kind of peaceful remedy the United States has sought, namely, a Security 
Council condemnation).  
127. See Memorandum from William H. Taft, supra note 125.  
128. See id.. See generally S.C. Res. 487, supra note 125 (detailing the UN’s 
condemnation of violent extremism and serving as an example of one kind of peaceful remedy 
the United States has sought, namely, Security Council condemnation). 
129. See Memorandum from William H. Taft, supra note 125; see also S.C. Res. 487, 
supra note 125 (detailing the UN’s condemnation of violent extremism and serving as an 
example of one kind of peaceful remedy the United States has sought, namely, Security 
Council condemnation). 
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treaty obligations and that the threat to Israel was too tenuous.130 
Thus, Israel’s destruction of the plant was considered neither 
proportional nor necessary, as is required for a preemptive self-
defense argument.131  
Israel’s case differs from the United States’ engagement against 
ISIS in a number of ways.132 First, the United States has already 
exhausted several peaceful remedies.133 It formed an international 
coalition and sought a Security Council resolution condemning ISIS 
(though not authorizing force).134 Second, ISIS is a non-state actor 
and a terrorist organization without a diplomatic body, eliminating 
diplomacy as a possible resource. 135 
In the Israeli case, by contrast, Israel was exerting force against a 
sovereign state, namely, Iraq.136 In this case, the United States and the 
international coalition have received permission from Iraq to assist in 
the retaliation against ISIS.137 While Israel may have had a legitimate 
                                                            
130. See Memorandum from William H. Taft, supra note 125; see also S.C. Res. 487, 
supra note 125 (detailing the UN’s condemnation of violent extremism and serving as an 
example of one kind of peaceful remedy the United States has sought, namely, Security 
Council condemnation). 
131. See Taft Memorandum, supra note 125, (discussing the legal basis for preemption 
and explaining the Israel case); see also S.C. Res. 487, supra note 125 (detailing the UN’s 
condemnation of violent extremism and serving as an example of one kind of peaceful remedy 
the United States has sought, namely, Security Council condemnation). 
132. Compare Taft Memorandum, supra note 125 (stating that the Security Council 
rejected the Israeli argument because Israel had not exhausted peaceful means), with S.C. Res. 
2178, (Sep. 24, 2014) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 2178] (expressing the UN’s condemnation of 
violent extremism). 
133. Compare Taft Memorandum, supra note 125 (stating that the Security Council 
rejected the Israeli argument because it did not exhaust peaceful means), with S.C. Res. 2178, 
supra note 132, (detailing the UN’s condemnation of violent extremism and serving as an 
example of one kind of peaceful remedy the United States has sought, namely, a Security 
Council condemnation). 
134. Background Conference Call on the President’s Address to the Nation (Sep. 10, 
2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/background-conference-call-
presidents-address-nation [hereinafter Background Conference Call] (stating the United States’ 
establishment of an international coalition); see also S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 132 (detailing 
the UN’s condemnation of violent extremism and serving as an example of one kind of 
peaceful remedy the United States has sought, namely, Security Council condemnation). 
135. See S.C. Res. 2170 (calling ISIS a “terrorist organization”); Background Conference 
Call, supra note 134 (calling ISIS a “terrorist organization” that will require “different tools” 
in response).  
136. Compare Taft Memorandum, supra note 125 (stating that Israel’s military action 
was against Iraq), with S.C. Res. 487, supra note 125 (condemning Israel’s military action). 
137. Deeks, supra note 47 (explaining that Iraq has given consent for engagement 
against ISIS which it “could withdraw”); Missy Ryan, U.S. urges Iraq to ensure coalition aid 
is effective against Islamic State, THE WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 9, 2015, http://www.
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State interest in pre-empting an Iraqi attack, the United Nations is 
founded on principles of deference toward State sovereignty and thus 
Israel had an uphill battle in justifying its use of force against a 
state.138 The United States, by contrast, would be engaging against a 
terrorist non-state actor, condemned by the very country it has taken 
as its host.139  
The Israeli case also differs from the US engagement against 
ISIS because the threat against Israel was more remote, according to 
the United Nations. The Iraqi reactor had not yet been put to any use 
against Israel according to the United Nations.140 The remoteness of 
the threat made the pre-emptive self-defense argument too weak to 
withstand Security Council scrutiny.141 ISIS has been waging a 
violent campaign for months and this may be sufficient to withstand 
Security Council scrutiny as to the proximity of the threat.142 
In addition to showing the imminence of the threat, the United 
States must show that the use of force is proportional under the 
Caroline test.143 The seminal case explaining proportionality is the 




(quoting Iraqi Defense Minister Khaled al-Obeidi as saying that Iraq has “asked for help from 
many countries that [it] has a strategic relationship with, and that includes the United States”). 
138. See U.N. Charter art. 59 (articulating the prohibition on use of force); see also U.N. 
Charter art. 2 (laying out the foundational principles of sovereignty).  
139. Compare Taft Memorandum, supra note 125 (stating that Israel’s military action 
was against Iraq), with S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 132 (detailing the UN’s condemnation of 
violent extremism and serving as an example of one kind of peaceful remedy the United States 
has sought, namely, Security Council condemnation). 
140. Compare Taft Memorandum, supra note 125 (stating that Iraqi reactor had not been 
put to use against Israel), with S.C. Res. 487, supra note 125 (condemning Israeli response to 
Iraqi reactors). 
141. Taft Memorandum, supra note 125 (stating that Israel’s pre-emptive self-defense 
argument was rejected); S.C. Res. 487, supra note 125 (condemning Israeli response to Iraqi 
reactors). 
142. Compare Taft Memorandum, supra note 125 (stating that Israel’s pre-emptive self-
defense argument was rejected), with S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 132 (detailing the UN’s 
condemnation of violent extremism and serving as an example of one kind of peaceful remedy 
the United States has sought, namely, Security Council condemnation). 
143. Denver, supra note 107 (explaining the basic tenets of the Caroline Test); Kearley, 
supra note 107, at 331 (outlining the history of the Caroline Test). 
144. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) (evaluating the proportionality of a United States military 
action); see also Armed Activities On the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. 
Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 19) (reinforcing the Nicaragua standard for 
proportionality).  
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relied heavily on whether there was an armed attack in order to 
discern whether the response of the United States was proportional.145 
The Nicaragua interpretation of proportionality involves the 
assessment of whether the counter-attack is proportionate to the attack 
itself and to the needs of self-defense.146 Thus, the United States’ 
argument for proportionality may hinge on whether ISIS is found to 
have conducted an “armed attack” against the United States and 
whether that attack warrants the United States tripartite response 
measures: air strikes, arming Syrian rebels, and the creation of an 
international coalition.147 
One challenge the United States may face in relying on the pre-
emptive self-defense argument is that the United States would be 
geographically confined to fighting ISIS only in Iraq because its 
engagement in Syria may not be supported by the Nicaragua 
ruling.148 In Nicaragua, the United States provided arms, financial 
assistance, and training to the Contras, the Nicaraguan opposition 
forces.149 This is factually similar to what the United States would be 
doing in Syria, namely, arming Syrian rebels so that they oppose the 
Syrian regime and fight ISIS.150 In Nicaragua, the I.C.J. held that the 
United States’ self-defense argument for arming the Nicaraguan 
                                                            
145. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. (evaluating the proportionality of a United States military 
action); see also Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. (reinforcing the Nicaragua standard 
for proportionality). 
146. Thomas M. Franck, On Proportionality of Countermeasures in International Law, 
102 AM. J. INT’L L. 715, 767 (2008) (arguing that proportionality depends on self-defense 
needs); see also Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. (Dec. 19) (reinforcing the Nicaragua 
standard for proportionality).  
147. See Franck, supra note 146, at 767 (arguing that proportionality depends on the 
self-defense needs); see also Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. (reinforcing the 
Nicaragua standard for proportionality).  
148. Compare Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. (describing the United States’ arming of the 
Nicaraguan opposition forces), with Earnest, supra note 16 (describing the United States plan 
to arm Syrian rebels) and Senior Administration Official, Background Conference Call on the 
President’s Address to the Nation (Sep. 10, 2014) http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/09/10/background-conference-call-presidents-address-nation (describing the 
United States plan to arm Syrian rebels).  
149. Compare Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. (describing the United States’ arming of the 
Nicaraguan opposition forces), with Josh Earnest, supra note 16 (describing the United States 
plan to arm Syrian rebels), and Senior Administration Official, supra note 15 (describing the 
United States plan to arm Syrian rebels).  
150. Compare Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. (describing the United States’ arming of the 
Nicaraguan opposition forces), with Earnest, supra note 16 (describing the United States plan 
to arm Syrian rebels), and Senior Administration Official, supra note 15 (describing the 
United States plan to arm Syrian rebels).  
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rebels could not be sustained.151 If the United States wants to engage 
against ISIS by arming the Syrian rebels they would need to argue 
that it is a justified pre-emptive self-defense measure distinguishable 
from the one in Nicaragua.152  
There are several ways this argument can be made. First, there 
are historical differences that may make the United States’ argument 
against ISIS stronger than the one struck down in Nicaragua.153 In 
Nicaragua, the United States supported Nicaraguan rebels so as to 
overthrow the existing political leader.154 Unlike Nicaragua, the 
United States’ engagement against ISIS is motivated by national 
security concerns and a desire to deter international terrorism.155 
Moreover, in the Nicaragua case, the I.C.J. ruled against the United 
States because the United States did not declare itself to be attacked, 
as required for an argument of individual self-defense.156 The 
argument that the United States was acting in self-defense held no 
water, according to the I.C.J.157 If the United States were to use the 
theory of pre-emptive self-defense to engage ISIS by arming Syrian 
rebels, there would be no need to declare the United States 
attacked.158 This is because the purpose of a pre-emptive strike would 
be to prevent the attack in question.159 Third, the fact that ISIS is a 
non-state actor and Nicaragua is a State makes the instant situation 
                                                            
151. See Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. (rejecting the United States’ self-defense claim). 
152. Id. 
153. Compare Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. (describing the United States’ arming of the 
Nicaraguan opposition forces), with Earnest, supra note 15 (describing the United States plan 
to arm Syrian rebels), and Senior Administration Official, supra note 16 (describing the 
United States plan to arm Syrian rebels).  
154. Compare Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. (describing the United States’ arming of the 
Nicaraguan opposition forces), with Earnest, supra note 16 (describing the United States plan 
to arm Syrian rebels), and Senior Administration Official, supra note 15 (describing the 
United States plan to arm Syrian rebels).  
155. Compare Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. (describing the United States’ arming of the 
Nicaraguan opposition forces), with Earnest, supra note 16 (describing the United States plan 
to arm Syrian rebels), and Senior Administration Official, supra note 15 (describing the 
United States plan to arm Syrian rebels).  
156. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. (ruling against the United States’ self-defense argument 
since they did not declare themselves attacked). 
157. Id. 
158. Taft, supra note 125 (explaining pre-emptive self-defense). Compare Nicar. v. U.S., 
1986 I.C.J. (describing the United States’ arming of the Nicaraguan opposition forces), with 
Earnest, supra note 16 (describing the United States plan to arm Syrian rebels), and Senior 
Administration Official, supra note 15 (describing the United States plan to arm Syrian 
rebels).  
159. Taft, supra note 125; Deeks, supra note 47 (laying out a pre-emptive self-defense 
argument the United States could make). 
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dissimilar to that of Nicaragua.160 Nicaragua’s statehood makes 
diplomacy a possible option, which is not the case in dealing with 
terrorist organizations like ISIS.161 These distinguishing factors may 
show that arming Syrian rebels would be a justifiable pre-emptive 
self-defense measure that would pass scrutiny under international 
law.162  
 E. Ongoing Conflict 
The final possible legal justification under international law is 
one that frames the hostility with ISIS as the most recent development 
in an “ongoing conflict” against al-Qaeda in the Middle East.163 The 
implications of this are twofold.164 First, if the United States’ 
engagement against ISIS is part of an ongoing conflict with al-Qaeda, 
the United States may not need renewed Security Council 
authorization for an armed conflict that has been going on since 
2001.165 Secondly, framing the engagement against ISIS as part of an 
“ongoing conflict” would mean that President Obama might not need 
additional justification under United States law to combat ISIS apart 
from the existing 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force.166 
                                                            
160. Compare Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. (describing the United States’ arming of the 
Nicaraguan opposition forces), with Earnest, supra note 16 (describing the United States plan 
to arm Syrian rebels), and Senior Administration Official, supra note 15 (describing the 
United States plan to arm Syrian rebels).  
161. See Taft, supra note 124 (discussing the legal basis for preemption); see also Nicar. 
v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 14 (June 27). 
162. Compare Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 14 (describing the United States’ arming of 
the Nicaraguan opposition forces), with Earnest, supra note 16 (describing the United States 
plan to arm Syrian rebels), and Senior Administration Official, supra note 15 (describing the 
United States plan to arm Syrian rebels). 
163. Deeks, supra note 47 (laying out the “ongoing conflict” argument briefly). See 
generally Senior Administration Official, supra note 15 (describing the United States plan to 
combat ISIS). 
164.  See Brett LoGiurato and Hunter Walker, Congressman: Obama’s Expansion of His 
ISIS Campaign is ‘Illegal’, BUSINESS INSIDER, Sep. 24, 2014, 
http://www.businessinsider.com/obama-isis-legal-aumf-congress-2014-9 (evaluating 
Administration officials’ claim that “ISIS falls under the 2001 AUMF because of its previous 
affiliation with al-Qaeda.”); see also Deeks, supra note 47 (explaining the international law 
implications of the “ongoing conflict” argument).  
165. Deeks, supra note 47 (stating that using the “ongoing conflict” argument as an 
international legal theory would force the United States to “confront the sovereignty/territorial 
issues involved in using force against ISIS in a foreign state”). See generally U.N. Charter art. 
2 ¶ 4 (making no mention of protocol for requests to use force for a new hostility in an 
ongoing conflict).  
166. See Senior Administration Official, supra note 15 (citing the 2001 AUMF as the 
source of authority under United States law for the President’s engagement against ISIS). But 
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Accordingly, the “ongoing conflict” argument would affect both the 
international law justifications and the US law justifications for 
engaging against ISIS.167  
There are a number of challenges associated with United States 
reliance on the “ongoing conflict” argument. First, the idea that ISIS 
is the latest chapter in an ongoing conflict with al-Qaeda is factually 
dependent on whether or not ISIS is actually related to al-Qaeda in 
some way.168 Whether or not ISIS is sufficiently affiliated with al-
Qaeda to qualify as being part of an “ongoing conflict” is subject to 
some debate.169 Another challenge associated with this argument is 
that it leaves unclear the United States’ obligations to the Security 
Council.170 Under the UN Charter, it is unclear whether the United 
States would still be obligated to seek a Security Council resolution 
for its use of force against ISIS, even if it is part of an ongoing 
conflict.171  
As of the time of publication of this Comment, the United 
States’ obligations before the Security Council remain in limbo if the 
United States uses the “ongoing conflict” argument.172 Though the 
United States does not yet have Security Council authorization, the 
                                                                                                                                     
cf., LoGiurato, supra note 164 (evaluating Administration officials’ claim that “ISIS falls 
under the 2001 AUMF because of its previous affiliation with al-Qaeda.”). 
167. See LoGiurato, supra note 164 (evaluating Administration officials’ claim that 
“ISIS falls under the 2001 AUMF because of its previous affiliation with al-Qaeda.”); see also 
Deeks, supra note 47 (explaining the international law implications of the “ongoing conflict” 
argument).  
168. See LoGiurato, supra note 164 (discussing the claim of whether ISIS is sufficiently 
affiliated with al-Qaeda); see also Deeks, supra note 47 ( proposing legal arguments under 
domestic law and exploring the international law implications of the “ongoing conflict” 
argument).  
169. See e.g., LoGiurato, supra note 164 (explaining the effect of ISIS’ affiliation with 
al-Qaeda on the “ongoing conflict” argument); see also Deeks, supra note 47 (explaining the 
international law implications of the “ongoing conflict” argument).  
170.  See generally U.N. Charter art. 2 ¶ 4 (making no mention of protocol for requests 
to use force for a new hostility in an ongoing conflict). See also U.N. Charter art. 51 (making 
no mention of an exception to the prohibition on use of force for new developments in ongoing 
conflicts). 
171. See generally U.N. Charter art. 2 ¶ 4 (setting forth international obligations for laws 
of war, but omitting discussion of when countries may use force for a new hostility in an 
ongoing conflict). See also U.N. Charter art. 51 (describing exceptions to the prohibition 
against use of force but making no mention of an exception for new developments in ongoing 
conflicts). 
172. See generally U.N. Charter art. 2 ¶ 4 (making no mention of protocol for requests to 
use force for a new hostility in an ongoing conflict). See also U.N. Charter art. 51 (making no 
mention of an exception to the prohibition on use of force for new developments in ongoing 
conflicts). 
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engagement against ISIS has already begun.173 This leaves questions 
open about what role a Security Council resolution would play in this 
specific scenario.174 As mentioned above, it could be reduced to a 
diplomatic veneer, rather than a hard source of legal authority.175 
Additionally, it could leave questions open about what transnational 
action would be authorized with and without a Security Council 
resolution.176 While the United Nations has not given authorization 
for use of military force against ISIS, Resolution 2178 does seem to 
internalize the “ongoing conflict” argument and extend it to 
engagement in the Levant in several ways.177 The resolution refers to 
the relevant entities as “the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant 
(‘ISIL’), the Al-Nusrah Front (‘ANF’) and other cells, affiliates, 
splinter groups or derivatives of Al-Qaida.”178 Notably, the resolution 
seems to imply some connection between ISIS and Al-Qaeda, a 
principle which fundamentally underpins the “ongoing conflict” 
argument.179 Additionally, by referring to it as ISIL, the resolution 
imbues the group with a transnational quality extending to the Levant, 
which includes Syria.180 This means that the authority granted in the 
resolution extends to all engagement within the Levant including 
Syria.181 This is one material way in which the “ongoing conflict” 
argument differs from the other arguments, discussed above, that the 
executive branch could make. Nevertheless, the “ongoing conflict” 
argument, and ultimately the United States’ strategy for developing an 
                                                            
173. See Josh Rogin, White House Has No International Legal Justification for Hitting 
ISIS in Syria, THE DAILY BEAST, Sep. 23, 2014, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/
09/15/white-house-has-no-international-legal-justification-for-hitting-isis-in-syria.html 
(pointing out the lack of United States international law justifications); see also Deeks, supra 
note 47 (explaining the international law implications of the “ongoing conflict” argument).  
174. See Rogin, supra note 173 (pointing out the lack of United States international law 
justifications); see also Deeks, supra note 47 (explaining the international law implications of 
the “ongoing conflict” argument).  
175. See Rogin, supra note 173 (stating that the United States provided no international 
law justifications); see also Deeks, supra note 47 (laying out the implications of using the 
“ongoing conflict” argument).  
176. See Rogin, supra note 173 (arguing that the United States should have provided an 
international law justification for engaging ISIS); see also Deeks, supra note 47 (explaining 
the international law implications of the “ongoing conflict” argument as well as other 
pathways for international justification).  




181. Id.  
2015] THE PEN AND THE SWORD 159 
international law justification would depend on whether the US 
Congress passes a new ISIS AUMF.182  
No matter what legal justification the United States chooses, its 
legal basis under US law for engaging against ISIS must be consistent 
with the United States’ obligations under international law.183 The US 
Congress would ultimately need to pass an AUMF consistent with the 
provisions of international law to which the United States is bound.184 
The following section will discuss the justifications under US law that 
the President could use to engage against ISIS and their implications 
for the United States’ international commitments.185  
II. JUSTIFICATIONS UNDER UNITED STATES LAW FOR 
ENGAGEMENT AGAINST ISIS  
This Part will deal with the potential legal theories under US law 
that would justify the President’s engagement against ISIS. It will 
also examine how potential AUMFs would interact with international 
law. The key issue  is whether a new AUMF would be consistent with 
the United States’ arguments under international law.   
In order to establish justification under US law, the White House 
had two choices.186 First, the President could seek Congressional 
authorization for military engagement.187 Second, he could proceed 
under the argument that involvement was authorized under the 
President’s executive powers, as granted by Article 2 of the United 
States Constitution.188 The White House ultimately chose the latter 
and argued that the President did not need Congressional 
authorization because the operation fell under his Article 2 
Presidential powers and because he was granted statutory authority 
under the 2001 AUMF.189 The White House’s use of the 2001 AUMF 
as a source of legal justification is subject to debate since the 2001 
                                                            
182. See generally infra Part II. 
183. See e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2(4) (stating the United States’ obligations under the 
U.N. charter regarding use of force); see Rogin, supra note 173 (pointing out the lack of 
United States international law justifications). 
184. See generally infra Part II. See e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2(4) (stating the United 
States’ obligations under the U.N. charter regarding use of force).  
185. See generally infra Part II.  
186. See generally infra Part II. 
187. U.S. CONST. art. II.  
188. Id. 
189.  See id.; see also Senior Official, supra note 15 (citing the 2001 AUMF as 
justification for engaging against ISIS). 
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AUMF was designed only to grant the President power to respond to 
organizations associated with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001.190 Critics argue that ISIS is a distinct group unrelated to the 
groups that engineered the September 11 attacks, and thus that the 
2001 AUMF alone does not grant the President the necessary 
authority to engage ISIS.191  
In the Fall of 2014, a number of new AUMFs were proposed by 
Congress to supply the President with the requisite US law 
justification.192 This section will discuss the use of the 2001 AUMF as 
a form of legal justification under US law. It will also explore what a 
new AUMF might need to comport with US and international law. 
Part II.A discusses the War Powers Resolution (“WPR”) and explores 
the sources of authority within the United States government for 
engaging against ISIS. Part II.B discusses the role of a sunset 
provision in an AUMF, clearly marking the expiration date of the 
authority it grants. Part II.C will discuss the geographic bounds of the 
engagement against ISIS that a new AUMF might propose. Finally, 
Part II.D will discuss how the international law justifications 
discussed in Part I would impact a new AUMF. 
A. Determining the Source of Authority: The War Powers Resolution  
The threshold legal question here relates to the federal balance of 
powers: who has the authority to authorize engagement against 
ISIS?193 On the one hand, the President can authorize engagement 
under his Article 2 Commander-in-Chief powers.194 On the other 
hand, Congress has the constitutional power to declare war under 
Article 1.195 Congress did not use its power to declare war and the 
                                                            
190.  See e.g., Logiurato, supra note 164 (arguing that the AUMF does not suffice as 
legal justification); Deeks, supra note 47 (discussing possible critiques to the AUMF as legal 
justification). 
191.  See e.g., Logiurato, supra note 164 (arguing for the insufficiency of the 2001 
AUMF as legal justification to engage ISIS); Deeks, supra note 47 (discussing possible 
problems with using the 2001 AUMF as legal justification). 
192.  Matthew C. Weed, Cong. Research Serv., R43760, A New Authorization for Use of 
Military Force Against the Islamic State: Comparison of Current Proposals in Brief, (2014) 
(laying out AUMFs proposed by Congress); see e.g., H.R.J. Res. 128, 113th Cong. (2014) 
(proposing an authorization for use of force against ISIS that would incorporate international 
law provisions). 
193. See U.S. CONST. art. II (granting presidential powers); see also U.S. CONST. art. I 
(granting congressional powers).  
194.  U.S. CONST. art. II. 
195.  U.S. CONST. art. I. 
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President exercised his executive powers to engage against ISIS.196 
Since the authorization of engagement against ISIS came from the 
President, the WPR is the relevant legislation in determining whether 
the President properly exercised his executive powers to engage 
ISIS.197  
The WPR interprets the President’s Commander-in-Chief 
powers as granted by the Constitution.198 It limits Presidential 
exercise of military force to the following three situations: “1) a 
declaration of war, 2) specific statutory authorization, or 3) a national 
emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or 
possessions, or its armed forces.”199 As there has been no declaration 
of war against ISIS, the first prong of the WPR would not apply in 
this case.200 According to the Obama Administration, the second 
prong applies here because the 2001 AUMF grants sufficient statutory 
authority for the President to authorize engagement against ISIS.201  
The manner in which the US government interprets its 
obligations under international law affects its Presidential Powers 
argument under the WPR in several ways.202 For instance, if the 
United States argues to the United Nations that there has been an 
“armed attack” for purposes of Article 51 authorization of force under 
international law, the United States may still retain ability to use the 
third prong of the WPR.203 The third prong grants justification for 
Presidential authorization of force in the case of a national emergency 
brought about by an attack on the United States.204 One reason the 
United States might not choose this argument is because there was no 
                                                            
196.  Letter from Barack Obama, supra note 115 (explaining the President’s engagement 
against ISIS); see also U.S. CONST. art. II (granting presidential powers). 
197. War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006). 
198.  Id. 
199. Id. If none of these prongs apply, the War Powers Resolution’s reporting 
requirements are triggered and the President must notify Congress within 48 hours of 
committing armed forces to military action. Additionally, the President must forbid armed 
forces from remaining for more than 60 days, unless one of the three prongs above applies. 
200.  Id. 
201. Background Conference Call, supra note 15 (citing the 2001 AUMF as a source of 
authority); Letter from Barack Obama, supra note 115 (explaining the President’s engagement 
against ISIS). 
202.  See generally supra Part I.E. 
203.  50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006).  
204.  Id.  
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territorial attack on the United States, its territories or possessions.205 
However, the United States might still be interested in making a self-
defense argument before the United Nations.206 This would require a 
showing that an “armed attack” occurred against the United States in 
the form of the murders of American journalists.207 If the United 
States can argue before the international community that an “armed 
attack” occurred for purposes of Article 51 of the UN Charter, it 
would have to make the same argument to establish justification 
under US law using the third prong of the War Powers Act.208 
Otherwise, the United States’ international justification would be 
inconsistent with its justification under US law.209  
If none of the three prongs of the WPR apply, the WPR 
reporting requirements and timetable would be triggered.210 This 
timetable limits the President’s authority to engage in hostilities to a 
maximum of 60 days.211 After these 60 days, the engagement would 
lose its legal force.212 If none of these three exceptions under the 
WPR are deemed applicable, the timetable would have already 
expired as of the publication of this Comment.213 Thus, the President 
would be in breach.214 However, the current position of the Obama 
Administration is that the President has specific statutory authority 
under the 2001 AUMF.215 Accordingly, it is the Obama 
                                                            
205. Cf. Abdallah, supra note 95 (showing the beheading of Peter Kassig by ISIS). See 
also Carter & Fantz, supra note 15 (discussing the brutality of ISIS violence against American 
journalist Steven Sotloff).  
206.  See generally supra Part I. 
207. See, e.g., Abdallah, supra note 95 (showing the beheading of Peter Kassig by ISIS); 
see also Carter & Fantz, supra note 95 (discussing the brutality of ISIS violence against 
American journalist Steven Sotloff).  
208. War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006); see also U.N. Charter art. 
51. The argument that an armed attack occurred for purposes of Article 51 would authorize the 
exercise of executive powers without triggering the War Powers Resolution’s reporting 
requirements if the presence of ISIS rose to the level of a “national emergency” as required by 
this prong. 
209. See 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006); see also U.N. Charter art. 51. 




214. 50 U.S.C. § 1541. 
215.  Id.  
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Administration’s position that no breach could occur because prong 
two of the WPR applies.216  
The use of the 2001 AUMF as statutory justification has inspired 
several critiques.217 One main critique is that the statute is thirteen 
years old and, as mentioned above, was intended for al-Qaeda and its 
progeny.218 In Secretary of State John Kerry’s testimony before 
Congress, he defended the use of the 2001 AUMF as a source of legal 
justification.219 Congressman Menendez replied to Kerry’s defense of 
the 2001 AUMF as follows:  
At least from the chair’s perspective, you’re going to need a new 
AUMF. And it will have to be more tailored because I don’t want 
to be part of [it] 13 years later and multitude of countries that 
have been used in this regard for that to be the authority.220  
Congress thus saw the President’s unilateral action against ISIS as an 
illegal use of the 2001 AUMF.221 Nevertheless, the Administration 
has welcomed the initiation of a new AUMF from Congress that 
would be specifically tailored to combating ISIS.222 There are 
                                                            
216.  Background Conference Call, supra note 15 (citing the 2001 AUMF as a source of 
authority); see also Letter from Barack Obama, supra note 115 (explaining the President’s 
engagement against ISIS). 
217.  See e.g., Logiurato, supra note 164 (arguing that the AUMF does not suffice as 
legal justification); Deeks, supra note 47 (discussing possible critiques to the AUMF as legal 
justification). 
218.  See e.g., Logiurato, supra note 164 (discussing the merits of the 2001 AUMF and 
concluding that the statute is too outdated to be applied to ISIS); Deeks, supra note 47 
(discussing problems with using the 2001 AUMF as justification for engaging against ISIS). 
219. Susan Jones, Kerry: Obama Administration Listening to ‘Good Lawyers’ Rather 
Than Congress, CNS NEWS (Sept. 18, 2014), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/susan-jones/
kerry-obama-administration-listening-good-lawyers-rather-congress (quoting Congressman 
Menendez’s critique of the use of the 2001 AUMF); see e.g., Logiurato, supra note 164 
(arguing that the AUMF does not suffice as legal justification); Deeks, supra note 47 
(discussing possible critiques to the AUMF as legal justification). 
220.  Jones, supra note 219 (quoting Congressman Menendez’s critique of the use of the 
2001 AUMF); see, e.g., Logiurato, supra note 164 (arguing that the AUMF does not suffice as 
legal justification); Deeks, supra note 47 (discussing possible critiques to the AUMF as legal 
justification). 
221. Jones, supra note 219 (quoting Congressman Menendez’s critique of the use of the 
2001 AUMF); see, e.g., LoGiurato, supra note 164 (arguing that the AUMF does not suffice as 
legal justification). 
222. Letter from Barack Obama, supra note 115 (stating that actions against ISIS are in 
the interest of national security); see also Senior Administration Official, supra note 15 
(detailing the plan to combat ISIS and prevent further violence).  
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currently seven such proposed ISIS AUMFs as of November 2014.223 
The following subsections describe some of the principal legal 
differences between the proposed AUMFs, specifically with regards 
to how they comport with international law. 
 B. Sunset Provision: The Duration of Authorized Force  
One of the main AUMF provisions argued for by scholars is a 
sunset provision that would clearly mark when the authorization of 
force would expire.224 Indeed, one reason the Obama Administration 
was able to rely on the September 2001 AUMF was because it 
contained no sunset provision.225 A sunset provision would not 
require the withdrawal of military forces before the objectives of the 
mission were completed.226 However, it would allow Congress to re-
consider at a later date the conditions upon which it would continue to 
support the evolving conflict.227 This sunset provision would need to 
take into account international law limitations for the timetable of the 
engagement.228 These limitations would vary depending on which of 
the above international law justifications the United States uses.229  
If the United States chooses the individual or collective self-
defense justifications under international law, the following may be 
                                                            
223. Weed, supra note 192 (laying out AUMFs proposed by Congress); see also H.R.J. 
Res. 128, 113th Cong. § 3 (2014) (proposing an authorization for use of force against ISIS that 
would incorporate international law provisions). 
224. See Jennifer Daskal & Stephen Vladeck, After the AUMF, 5 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 
115, 142-44 (2014); see also Weed, supra note 192, at 4-5 (laying out AUMFs proposed by 
Congress). 
225. See Goldsmith, supra note 34 (arguing that the 2001 AUMF is too expansive a 
grant of executive power); see also LoGiurato, supra note 164 (arguing that ISIS is not 
connected to perpetrators of 9/11 and cannot be fought under the 2001 AUMF).  
226. Rosa Brooks et. al., Principles to Guide Congressional Authorization of the 
Continued Use of Force Against ISIL, JUST SECURITY (2014), http://justsecurity.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/ISIS-AUMF-Statement-FINAL.pdf (listing principles needed for a 
new AUMF); see Daskal, supra note 224, at 142 (discussing the legal needs with regards to a 
new AUMF). 
227. Brooks et. al., supra note 226 (discussing guiding principals for the drafting of a 
new AUMF); see Daskal, supra note 224, at 142 (discussing the legal needs with regards to a 
new AUMF).  
228. Brooks et. al., supra note 226 (listing principles needed for a new AUMF); see 
Daskal, supra note 224, at 143 (explaining potential considerations in the drafting of a new 
AUMF).  
229. Brooks et. al., supra note 226 (listing relevant principles to the drafting of a new 
AUMF for engaging against ISIS); see Daskal, supra note 224 (exploring ways to draft a new 
AUMF for ISIS).  
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relevant considerations applicable to an AUMF sunset provision.230 
Under Article 51 of the UN Charter, a State may only exercise its 
right to self-defense only “until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”231 
This poses the question of when a State’s right to self-defense 
ceases.232 The most generous timeframe given among the seven 
proposed AUMFs is a sunset provision of three years after the date of 
enactment provided by Senate Joint Resolution 42.233 It would be 
difficult to discern when the United Nations has taken actions 
sufficient to override the United States’ stake in its own self-defense 
or the coalition’s collective self-defense.234 Indeed, it is unclear 
whether the United Nations would have to simply take measures or 
whether those measures would have to be proven successful in order 
to terminate the state’s right to self-defense.235 A sunset provision 
may need to take into account this limitation under international 
law.236 Otherwise, the situation may arise where the President has 
authority under US law to continue engagement but no authority 
under international law.237  
C. Geographic Limitation: The Bounds of Engagement 
Of the new AUMFs proposed, only two have provisions 
articulating a geographic limitation to engagement against ISIS.238 
House Joint Resolution 125 proposes that “authority . . . shall be 
confined to the territory of the Republic of Iraq and the Syrian Arab 
                                                            
230. Brooks et. al., supra note 226 (listing principles needed for a new AUMF); see 
Daskal, supra note 224, at 136-37 (discussing the legal needs with regards to a new AUMF).  
231. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
232. Id.  
233. S.J. Res. 42, 113th Cong. (2013-2014).  
234. See Brooks, supra note 226 (listing principles needed for a new AUMF); Vladeck, 
supra note 224 (discussing the legal needs with regards to a new AUMF); see also U.N. 
Charter art. 51 (making no mention of when a country’s right to self-defense ceases); U.N. 
Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
235. See U.N. Charter art. 51 (making no mention of when a country’s right to self-
defense ceases); see also U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
236. See U.N. Charter art. 51 (laying out the exceptions for the prohibition on use of 
force and making no mention of when a right to self-defense would cease); see also U.N. 
Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
237. See U.N. Charter art. 51 (listing the two self-defense exceptions to the prohibition 
against use of force); see also U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
238. See S.J. Res. 44, 113th Cong. § 2 (2014); H.R.J. Res. 125, 113th Cong. § 2 (2014) 
(proposing an authorization for use of force against ISIS); Weed, supra note 192, at 13 (laying 
out AUMFs proposed by Congress). 
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Republic.”239 However, under this AUMF, the limitation would not 
apply to foreign military training activities.240 The second AUMF 
containing a provision is Senate Joint Resolution 44, which would 
also confine the authorization to Iraq and Syria.241 However, as 
articulated above, there may be geographic limitations to United 
States involvement imposed by international law.242 While Senate 
Joint Resolution 44 and House Joint Resolution 125 allow for 
engagement within Syrian territory, the United Nations has not as of 
the publication of this Comment.243  
While Iraq has consented to international assistance in fighting 
ISIS, Syria has not given consent.244 The authorization to violate 
Syrian sovereignty would thus have to be authorized by the United 
Nations.245 Indeed, Senate Joint Resolution 44 not only authorizes the 
use of force against Syria but clarifies that “[n]othing in this 
resolution shall be construed as . . . authorizing support for force in 
support of, or in cooperation with, the national government of Syria . . 
. or its security services.”246 Thus, any authorized engagement under 
Senate Joint Resolution 44 would be by definition adverse to the 
Syrian government.247 Unlike House Joint Resolution 125, Senate 
Joint Resolution 44 requires that the United States act in conjunction 
with an international coalition.248 This proposed AUMF is 
preoccupied with maintaining the international character of the 
                                                            
239. H.R.J. Res. 125 § 2(b) (proposing an authorization for use of force against ISIS); 
see Weed, supra note 192, at 13 (laying out AUMFs proposed by Congress). 
240. H.R.J. Res. 125 § 2(c) (proposing an authorization for use of force against ISIS); 
see Weed, supra note 192, at 13 (discussing limitations on use of military force in AUMFs 
proposed by Congress). 
241. S.J. Res. 44 § 2(a) (proposing an authorization for use of force against ISIS); see 
Weed, supra note 192, at 13 (laying out AUMFs proposed by Congress). 
242 See supra Part I. 
243. S.J. Res. 44 § 2(a) (proposing an authorization for use of force against ISIS); H.R.J. 
Res. 125 § 2(b) (proposing an authorization for use of force against ISIS); see Weed, supra 
note 192 (laying out AUMFs proposed by Congress). 
244. See Deeks, supra note 47. See generally Weed, supra note 192 (laying out AUMFs 
proposed by Congress); U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
245. See U.N. Charter, art. 2, ¶ 4; see also U.N. Charter art. 51. 
246. S.J. Res. 44, 113th Cong. § 6(1) (2014); see Weed, supra note 192, at 14 (laying out 
AUMFs proposed by Congress). 
247. See S.J. Res. 44 (proposing an authorization for use of force against ISIS); Weed, 
supra note 192, at 14 (laying out AUMFs proposed by Congress). 
248. Compare S.J. Res. 44 § 2(a) (requiring that the United States act in conjunction 
with an international coalition), with H.R.J. Res. 125, 113th Cong. § 2(a) (2014) (proposing an 
alternative AUMF); see Weed, supra note 192, at 16 (laying out AUMFs proposed by 
Congress). 
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engagement against ISIS. The use of the international coalition helps 
the United States retain its argument that engagement may be legal 
under customary international law, even without a United Nations 
resolution.249 However, while there may be policy reasons for 
sanctioning this adverse use of force in Syria, it might not pass legal 
muster under international standards discussed in Part I.250 
D. The International Coalition: “The Enemy of my Enemy” 
The legality of these proposed AUMFs may also depend on 
whether the United States relied on a collective self-defense argument 
for international legal justification.251 If so, cooperation with other 
countries would be required under international law by definition.252 
However, it is unclear whether some of these proposed AUMFs 
would require cooperation with other States or whether the AUMFs 
simply presume it.253 For example, the international provision under 
House Resolution 5415 states that the President may use force “with 
the close consultation, coordination, and cooperation with NATO and 
regional allies.”254 This is a narrower view of the requisite 
international cooperation than the one in other proposed AUMFs, 
which ask for United States cooperation with the broader international 
community including allies in the Middle East.255 A UN Security 
Council Resolution may determine this to be an engagement of global 
importance meriting the most expansive international involvement 
possible.256 Thus, a Security Council resolution, if produced, could be 
                                                            
249. Compare S.J. Res. 44 § 2(a) (requiring that the United States act in conjunction 
with an international coalition), with H.R.J. Res. 125 § 2(a) (proposing an alternative AUMF); 
see Weed, supra note 192, at 16 (laying out AUMFs proposed by Congress). 
250. See generally supra Part I (discussing international law provisions applicable to the 
United States engagement against ISIS).  
251. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text; see generally supra Part I.B. 
252. See supra Part I.B. 
253. Compare S.J. Res. 44, 113th Cong. § 2(a) (2014)(requiring that the United States 
act in conjunction with an international coalition), with H.R.J. Res. 125, 113th Cong. § 2(a) 
(2014) (proposing an alternative AUMF); see Weed, supra note 192, at 16 (laying out AUMFs 
proposed by Congress). 
254. H.R. 5415, 113th Cong. § 2(a) (2014). 
255. Compare H.R. 5415 § 2(a) (requiring that the United States act in conjunction with 
NATO allies), with H.R.J. Res. 125 §2(a) (proposing an alternative AUMF); see Weed, supra 
note 192, at 16 (laying out AUMFs proposed by Congress). 
256. Compare S.C. Res. 2178, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2178 ¶¶ 1, 15 (Sep. 24, 2014) (detailing 
the UN’s condemnation of violent extremism and deeming it an issue of international 
concern), with H.R. 5415 § 2(a) (requiring only that the United States act in conjunction with 
NATO allies).  
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in tension with a US AUMF that limits the United States’ 
international partnerships.257 
The only resolution that takes into account the possibility of a 
UN Security Council Resolution is House Joint Resolution 128.258 
This proposed AUMF would track the orders of a UN Security 
Council Resolution and authorize the President to act accordingly.259 
Under House Joint Resolution 128, if there is no UN Security Council 
Resolution, the President would be limited to military engagement 
that does not involve American boots on the ground.260 Moreover, the 
reporting requirements under House Joint Resolution 128 would be 
different depending on whether or not there is a UN Security Council 
Resolution.261 If there is none, the President would have to show that 
the United States sought but did not receive a Security Council 
resolution authorizing the use of force.262 Additionally, the President 
would have to 1) show that the United States is still working to build 
a broad international coalition to counter ISIS and 2) present a 
strategy before Congress for combatting ISIS.263 
All proposed AUMFs would have to pass muster under US law 
as well as international law.264 In addition to the international 
concerns articulated above, there are several other US policy 
questions these AUMFs must deal with.265 For example, an AUMF 
would have to decide whether the preceding 2001 and 2002 AUMFs 
should be repealed.266 Another concern would be whether this 
authorization of force should be limited to ISIS in its current form or 
whether it would grant authorization for any changes in ISIS’s 
structure.267 For instance, new AUMFs might consider whether an 
                                                            
257. Compare S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 257, ¶¶ 1, 15 (detailing the UN’s 
condemnation of violent extremism and deeming it an issue of international concern), with 
H.R. 5415, 113th Cong. § 2(a) (2014) (requiring only that the United States act in conjunction 
with NATO allies).  
258. H.R.J. Res. 128, 113th Cong. § 3 (2014); see Weed, supra note 192, at 12. 
259. See H.R.J. Res. 128 § 3(a)(2); Weed, supra note 192, at 12. 
260. See H.R.J. Res. 128 § 4(a); Weed, supra note 192, at 19. 
261. H.R.J. Res. 128 §§ 3, 4; see Weed, supra note 192, at 14-15. 
262. See H.R.J. Res. 128 § 4(b); Weed, supra note 192, at 14-15. 
263. See H.R.J. Res. 128 § 4(a)(1)(B), (b)(2); Weed, supra note 192, at 14-15. 
264. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (detailing U.S. obligations under international law); 
Brooks, supra note 226, ¶ 5. 
265. See generally Brooks, supra note 226 (suggesting principles for drafting new 
AUMFs; Weed, supra note 192 (laying out AUMFs proposed by Congress). 
266. See Brooks, supra note 226, ¶ 4; Weed, supra note 192, at 9. 
267. See Brooks, supra note 226, ¶ 1; Weed, supra note 192, at 7-8. 
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AUMF should authorize engagement against ISIS if they cross 
borders and infiltrate other States aside from Iraq and Syria.268  
There are also some questions that arise related to the precedent 
this AUMF will set.269 For instance, it is unclear whether a new 
AUMF would repudiate the President’s original position when he 
cited the 2001 AUMF as legal authority.270 The way in which 
Congress handles the passing of a new AUMF and the way in which 
the United States complies with international law could determine 
much of the jus ad bellum jurisprudence going forward for 
combatting terrorist groups and non-state actors.271 
In summary, a new AUMF would consider several issues such as 
whether a sunset provision should be included and whether 
developments in the US international law justification should be 
considered.272 As of the publication of this Comment, only House 
Joint Resolution 128 takes into account the possibility of a Security 
Council resolution.273 Part III will discuss what the best course of 
action would be for the United States so that it stays true to its 
obligations under international and US law.  
III. LEGAL LEGITIMACY AND FUTURE QUESTIONS  
Abram Chayes, a Kennedy-era legal scholar, spoke of the Cuban 
Missile crisis in the following terms, equally applicable to the 
engagement against ISIS:  
We were armed, necessarily, with something more substantial 
than a lawyer’s brief. But though it would not have been enough 
merely to have the law on our side, it is not irrelevant which side 
the law was on. The effective deployment of force, the appeal for 
world support, to say nothing of the ultimate judgment of history, 
all depend in significant degree on the reality and coherence of 
the case in law for our action. It is worthwhile, I think, to set out 
that legal case and to examine some of its implications.274 
                                                            
268. See Brooks, supra note 226, ¶ 2; see also Weed, supra note 192, at 8. 
269. See generally supra Part II.B. 
270. See supra Part II.B. 
271. See supra Part I. 
272. See generally supra Part II. 
273. See H.R.J. Res. 128, 113th Cong. §§ 3, 4 (2014); Weed, supra note 192, at 12-13 
(laying out AUMFs proposed by Congress).  
274. Abram Chayes, Law and the Quarantine of Cuba, 41 FOREIGN AFF. 550, 550 
(1963) (discussing the legality of events surrounding the Cuban Missile Crisis). 
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In keeping with Chayes’ philosophy, the legitimacy and legality 
of the United States engagement against ISIS is not only important for 
its own sake, but as a strategy to bolster the effectiveness of 
international relations.275 The US response to ISIS is important 
because the extent to which the United States complies with its own 
law will serve as a litmus test for United States’ integrity in the face 
of war.276 More broadly, the adherence of the international 
community to fundamental principles of international law will 
reinforce the legitimacy of rules established to keep the world in order 
during a time of hostility.277 Considering the tools available in the 
executive branch’s toolbox as laid out in Parts I and II, Part III will 
make a normative argument for which justification under international 
and US law is most appropriate for the engagement against ISIS. 
Barring certain circumstantial changes discussed below, the 
international law theory of collective self-defense is most appropriate. 
 A. International Law 
The appropriate justification under international law for 
engaging against ISIS depends on whether the United States intends 
to seek a Security Council resolution, and whether that resolution 
could survive a veto by one of the permanent five members.278 
Without a resolution, the United States would still have a strong 
collective self-defense argument and could probably proceed in Iraq 
under Article 51 without Security Council authorization.279 However, 
the United States’ actions would be confined to Iraq.280 For any action 
in Syria, the United States would need to pursue Security Council 
authorization in order to be in accord with international law.281 
Without authorization from the Security Council to engage in Syria, 
the United States would need to rely on customary international law 
as the legal basis for engaging ISIS in Syria by arming the Syrian 
rebels.282  
                                                            
275. See generally supra Part I. 
276. See generally supra Part II. 
277. See generally supra Part II. 
278. See The Security Council, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/ 
en/sc/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2015) (describing the veto power of the five permanent members of 
the Security Council); see also U.N. Charter art. 51. 
279. See supra Part I.B; U.N. Charter art. 51. 
280. See supra Part I.B; U.N. Charter art. 51. 
281. See generally supra Part I; U.N. Charter art. 51. 
282. See supra Part I; see also U.N. Charter art. 51. 
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First, it is important to establish why an individual self-defense 
argument is unlikely to be appropriate in this case.283 While the 
United States’ national security interests are at play, it likely has not 
suffered a sufficient “armed attack” as required for an individual self-
defense argument under Article 51.284 Indeed, the murders of the 
American journalists and personnel abroad allow for some argument 
to be made about the United States suffering an “armed attack” by 
ISIS.285  
However, it is unclear whether this is sufficient to rise to the 
standard of an “armed attack” as laid out by the Nicaragua case.286 
Even if it were, the United States would be bound to respond 
proportionally.287 If the “armed attack” in this case is the killing of a 
number of American journalists, the American air strikes, arming of 
Syrian rebels, and forming of an international coalition arguably are 
not proportional responses.288 If the United States relied on an 
individual self-defense argument, it would likely be in violation of jus 
in bello.289 Given the strong transnational policy reasons for engaging 
against a violent force like ISIS, an argument of collective self-
defense under Article 51 would be more appropriate.290  
While the United States has its own national security interests 
that may motivate engagement against ISIS, that does not keep this 
from being an instance of collective rather than individual self-
defense.291 As discussed in Part I, the engagement in Iraq against ISIS 
has the trappings of a collective self-defense situation because Iraq 
has consented to the involvement of other nations in quelling a rogue 
non-state actor.292 Indeed, the United States is only one of many 
nations involved in engaging against ISIS.293 Since there is no UN 
                                                            
283. See generally supra Part I.C; U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
284. See supra Part I.C; U.N. Charter art. 51. 
285. See U.N. Charter art. 51; see, e.g., Abdallah, supra note 95 (showing the beheading 
of Peter Kassig by ISIS); Carter & Fantz, supra note 95 (discussing the brutality of ISIS 
violence against American journalist Steven Sotloff).  
286. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text (analyzing the definition of “armed 
attack” in Nicaragua).  
287. See Denver, supra note 107, at 325 (explaining the basic tenets of the Caroline 
Test); see also Kearley, supra note 107, at 174 (outlining the history of the Caroline Test). 
288. See Denver, supra note 107 (explaining the basic tenets of the Caroline Test); see 
also Kearley, supra note 107 (outlining the history of the Caroline Test). 
289. See supra Part I.C. 
290. See supra Part I.B. 
291. See supra Part I.B. 
292. See supra Part I.B. 
293. See supra Part I.B. 
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Security Council resolution in effect permitting the entire 
international coalition to engage against ISIS, each state would have 
to come up with its own self-defense argument if this were not an 
instance of collective self-defense.294 
If defined as an instance of collective self-defense, engaging 
against ISIS would be justified under Nicaragua because an “armed 
attack” against Iraq has occurred.295 The “armed attacks” are clear: 
ISIS has overtaken cities, engaged in human rights violations, and 
violently killed civilians.296 Moreover, the military measures taken by 
the United States and the international coalition in response to ISIS’s 
gross violations of international law are likely to be considered 
necessary and proportional.297 The violence of ISIS and the damage it 
has inflicted on Iraq likely suffice to say that it is necessary to 
respond. The response is proportional because the United States-led 
international coalition has primarily used air strikes in Iraq to target 
key leaders. Since the United States has yet to engage ISIS with boots 
on the ground and has thus far only used air strikes, the response 
likely meets the proportionality requirement under international 
law.298 
Defining the engagement against ISIS as an instance of 
collective self-defense would not erase the role of the UN Security 
Council.299 Under Article 51, the inherent right of self-defense here 
would only last until the United Nations took measures to restore the 
peace.300 The exercise of the inherent right to collective self-defense 
by the international coalition—and therefore the United States—
would not undermine the involvement of the United Nations.301 It 
would also not leave the international community at the mercy of a 
Security Council veto, potentially by Russia or China.302 This would 
                                                            
294. See supra Part I.C. 
295. See supra notes 296-97. 
296. See U.N. Charter art. 51; see, e.g., Abdallah, supra note 95 (showing the beheading 
of Peter Kassig by ISIS); Carter & Fantz, supra note 95 (discussing the brutality of ISIS 
violence against American journalist Steven Sotloff). 
297. See U.N. Charter art. 51; Denver, supra note 107, at 5 (explaining the basic tenets 
of the Caroline Test); see, e.g., Abdallah, supra note 95 (showing the beheading of Peter 
Kassig by ISIS); Carter & Fantz, supra note 95 (discussing the brutality of ISIS violence 
against American journalist Steven Sotloff). 
298. Denver, supra note 107. See generally supra Part I. 
299. See generally supra Part I. 
300. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
301. See id. See generally supra Part I. 
302. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text. 
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also still leave open the question of whether engagement against ISIS 
in Syria—or in territories beyond Iraq—can be justified under 
international law.303 
One answer to this question would rely on customary 
international law.304 For geopolitical reasons involving a Russian 
alliance with the Syrian regime, the Security Council would likely 
veto a resolution authorizing the arming of Syrian rebels.305 In order 
to argue that the international coalition can arm the Syrian rebels, the 
international coalition would have show that under customary 
international law, the engagement is legal.306 This argument would be 
made stronger if the coalition could show as a factual matter that 
arming the Syrian rebels is a compelling if not necessary means to 
defeating ISIS in Iraq.307  
Moreover, to be justified under customary international law, the 
engagement would have to meet two criteria.308 First, it would have to 
be ubiquitously agreed to—as is likely the case by the mere presence 
of the international coalition against ISIS. Second, the members of the 
international coalition would have to be acting in a way they believe 
is legal.309 As of November 12, 2014, the countries in the 
international coalition engaging against ISIS have taken active 
measures ranging from air strikes to the distribution of humanitarian 
aid.310 Since a large part of the international community acquiesced to 
engaging against ISIS without an explicit grant from the Security 
Council, it is likely that they believe their behavior to be legal.311  
Moreover, if States believe themselves to be acting in collective 
self-defense of Iraq, they would be acting under the color of law, 
believing to be justified under Article 51.312 If the engagement of the 
                                                            
303. See generally supra Part I. 
304. See generally supra Part I. 
305. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text. 
306. See supra Part I.B-D. 
307. See supra Part I.B-D. 
308. See Customary IHL, International Committee of the Red Cross, https://www.icrc.
org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_in_asofcuin [hereinafter Customary IHL] (explaining the 
two main elements of customary international law); see also Statute of the International Court 
of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter 
I.C.J. Statute]. 
309.  See Customary IHL, supra note 308 (laying out the elements of customary 
international law); see also Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, ¶ 1(b), June 26, 
1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 933. 
310. See supra Part I. 
311. See generally supra Part I; I.C.J. Statute, supra note 308, art. 38, ¶ 1(b). 
312. See I.C.J. Statute art. 38(1)(b); U.N. Charter art. 51. 
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international coalition were illegal, the UN Security Council would 
have condemned the response.313 Thus, it is likely that the 
engagement against ISIS is legal under customary international 
law.314 As discussed above, if there is a strong argument for the 
necessity of arming Syrian rebels in order to combat ISIS in Iraq, the 
United States and the international community’s arming of the Syrian 
rebels may also be legal under customary international law.315 As 
Professor Harold Koh would call it, justifying the engagement against 
ISIS in Syria might be an example of “transnational legal process.”316 
In this case, international law governs not with treaties formally 
negotiated, but with “the dynamic interaction of private and public 
actors in a variety of national and international fora to generate norms 
and construct national and global interests.”317 
 B. Legal Justification under US Law 
The 2001 AUMF serves as insufficient statutory justification for 
the United States’ engagement against ISIS.318 Even if it is factually 
determined that ISIS and al-Qaeda are linked enough to both come 
under the 2001 AUMF, it would be inconsistent to argue that the 
President needs no further grant of authority to combat ISIS.319 This is 
because, under international law, the President would need renewed 
Security Council authorization if the United States were not acting 
under one of the Article 51 exceptions.320 Since fighting ISIS would 
involve a separate military enterprise than the one the United States 
used to combat al-Qaeda, the United States would need separate 
Security Council authorization.321 It would be inconsistent if the 
United States argued that it needed no further statutory authority from 
Congress because ISIS is part of an “ongoing conflict” but 
simultaneously asked for a separate grant of authority from the 
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Security Council.322 For these reasons, the use of the existing AUMF 
could potentially lead the United States to adopt this inconsistent legal 
standpoint.323 Either that or the United States would be forced to 
argue that it is engaging against ISIS on grounds of individual self-
defense and thus requires no further UN authorization.324 This 
argument is likely to fail for the reasons laid out in Part III.A.325 
Congress’ new AUMF would need to be consistent with 
international law.326 Moreover, the existence of a UN resolution 
authorizing engagement against ISIS remains a moving target as of 
the publication of this Comment.327 Out of the AUMFs drafted by 
Congress, House Joint Resolution 128 is the AUMF most likely to 
withstand scrutiny under international law because it tracks the 
existence of a UN Resolution.328 It also leaves room for the United 
States to argue that it is engaging against ISIS as a matter of 
collective self-defense.329 One of the main issues with House Joint 
Resolution 128 would be that it gives a broad grant of power to the 
President, enabling him to engage against ISIS in the Levant 
generally.330 
This may lead to a situation where the President has authority 
under US law to engage against ISIS in Syria without having 
international authority.331 This is precisely why the collective self-
defense argument under international law is the one best suited to the 
United States in this situation.332 Practically, it would leave open the 
door for the United States to argue that engagement in Syria is either 
necessary for collective self-defense or justified under customary 
international law.333  
If House Joint Resolution 128 were coupled with an 
international law justification that required Security Council 
authorization, the President’s US law authorization would then be in 
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tension with international law.334 If the Security Council decided not 
to authorize engagement in Syria, a question of legislative supremacy 
would arise.335 If Congress gave the President a broad grant of power 
to engage in the Levant generally (including Syria), it is unclear 
whether international law would trump US law.336 This may be a 
problematic situation because it would lead to a crisis of legitimacy 
for the Security Council and it would make the United States appear 
to be violating international law with impunity.337  
Finally, as discussed in Part II, any new AUMF would need to 
take into account compliance with other realms of international laws 
of war such as jus in bello.338 House Joint Resolution 128 is one 
example of an AUMF that would incorporate the language of 
“necessary and appropriate” force, which triggers US compliance 
with international law.339 Congress should ensure consistency with 
international law by authorizing “necessary and appropriate force.”340 
This would constitute an implicit authorization for the President to 
use those means of force that are “fundamental and accepted incidents 
of war by universal agreement and practice.”341 This language would 
mean that the United States would be bound to comply with 
international treaties like the UN Charter, but also customary 
international law.342 This would be a US incorporation of 
international law regarding principles of jus in bello like 
proportionality, precaution, and distinction.343 It would also act as a 
legal stopper against violations of the laws of war, reinforcing the 
consistency between United States law and international 
obligations.344 
 In conclusion, ISIS presents unique problems for the United 
States’ jus ad bellum jurisprudence.345 It will also set important 
precedents because the United States engagement against ISIS 
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represents a turning point in how US foreign policy deals with non-
state actors in international crises.346 How the United States responds 
in this instance will also have important implications for how 
Presidential war powers are construed and how the United States 
incorporates international law into its own federal law going forward. 
Accordingly, the AUMF passed by Congress should take into account 
the argument the United States makes to the international community 
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